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Abstract
Although privacy is generally considered to be the right of an individual or group to
control information about themselves, such a right has become challenging to protect
in the digital era, this is exemplified by the case of cloud-based genomic computing.
Despite the rapid progress in understanding, producing, and using genomic information,
the practice of genomic data protection remains a fairly underdeveloped area. One of
the indisputable reasons is that most nonexpert individuals do not realize the sensitive
nature of their genomic data, unless it has been used against them. Many commercial
organizations take advantage of their customers by taking control of personal genomic
information, if customers want to benefit from services such as genetic analysis; even
worse, these organizations often do not enforce proper protection, which could result in
embarrassing data breaches. In this thesis, we investigate the potential threats of cloud-
based genomic computing systems and propose various countermeasures by taking into
account the functionality requirement.
We begin with the most basic system where only symmetric encryption is needed
for the cloud storage of genomic data, and we propose a new solution that protects the
data against brute-force attacks that threaten the security of password-based encryption
in direct-to-consumer companies. The solution employs honey encryption, where plain-
text messages need to be transformed to a different space with uniform distribution on
elements. We present a novel distribution-transformation encoder. We provide formal
security proof of our solution.
We analyze the scenario where efficient searching on encrypted data is necessary. We
propose a system that provides fast retrieval on encrypted compressed data and that
enables individuals to authorize access to fine-grained regions during data retrieval. Our
solution addresses three critical dimensions in platforms that use large genomic data:
encryption, compression, and efficient data retrieval. Compared with a previous de facto
standard solution for storing aligned genomic data, our solution uses 18% less storage.
To enable complicated data analysis, we focus on a proposal for secure quality-control
of genomic data by using secure multi-party computation based on garbled circuits. Our
proposal is for aggregated genomic data sharing, where researchers want to collaborate
to perform large-scale genome-wide association studies in order to identify significant
genetic variants for certain diseases. Data quality control is the very first stage of such
a collaboration and remains a driving factor for further steps. We investigate the fea-
sibility of advanced cryptographic techniques in the data protection of this phase. We
demonstrate that for certain protocols, our solution is efficient and scalable.
With the advent of precision medicine based on genomic data, the future of big data
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has become clearly inseparable from cloud-based genomic computing. It is important
to continuously re-evaluate the standards of cloud-based genomic computing as novel
technologies are developed, security threats arise, and more complex genomic analyses
become possible. This is not only a battle against cyber criminals, but also against rigid
and ignorant practices. Integrative solutions that carefully consider the use and misuse of
personal genomic data are essential for ensuring secure, effective storage and maximizing
utility in treating and preventing disease.
Keywords : genomic privacy, cloud computing, brute-force attacks, password-based en-
cryption, honey encryption, compression, order-preserving encryption, secure multi-party
computation, differential privacy, garbled circuits
Re´sume´
Eˆtre en mesure de prote´ger sa vie ou sphe`re prive´e en controˆlant la divulgation de ses
donne´es personnelles est traditionnellement conside´re´ comme un droit. Malheureuse-
ment, cet acquis est devenu difficile a` prote´ger dans l’e`re nume´rique. Il en va partic-
ulie`rement ainsi pour les donne´es ge´nomiques, sur lesquelles des calculs doivent souvent
eˆtre exe´cute´s directement dans le “cloud”. En de´pit des rapides progre`s scientifiques
dans la compre´hension, la production et l’usage des donne´es ge´nomiques, la protection
de celles-ci reste un sujet relativement peu de´veloppe´. La me´connaissance des enjeux
de´pendants de la protection de ces donne´es, dont font preuve la plupart des non-initie´s,
en est l’une des raisons. Plusieurs entreprises proposent, par exemple, des analyses
ge´ne´tiques a` leurs clients et profitent de leur relative ignorance pour utiliser leurs donne´es
ge´nomiques. De fac¸on plus inquie´tante encore, certaines de ces organisations ne prote`gent
pas correctement les donne´es re´colte´es, les rendant vulne´rables a` des vols. Dans cette
the`se, nous e´tudions les potentielles menaces sur les syste`mes de stockage et traitement de
donne´es ge´nomiques base´s sur une approche “cloud-computing”, et proposons plusieurs
solutions afin de les prote´ger tout en respectant leurs impe´ratifs en terme de fonction-
nalite´s et performances.
Sur la base d’un syste`me basique dans lequel les donne´es sont simplement prote´ge´es a`
l’aide d’un chiffrement syme´trique avant d’eˆtre stocke´es dans le “cloud”, nous proposons
une nouvelle solution pre´venant contre les attaques de type “brute-force” qui menacent
habituellement la se´curite´ du chiffrement par mot de passe. Cette solution repose sur le
chiffrement “honey”, dans lequel les messages en clair sont pre´alablement transforme´s de
manie`re a` suivre une distribution uniforme. Nous pr
’esentons une nouvelle transformation de distribution et donnons une preuve formelle de
la se´curite´ de notre solution. Nous nous inte´ressons ensuite a` un sce´nario dans lequel une
me´thode de recherche efficace dans des donne´es chiffre´es est ne´cessaire. Nous proposons
un syste`me capable de retrouver rapidement un e´le´ment dans des donne´es chiffre´es et
compresse´es, tout en permettant aux utilisateurs d’en limiter l’acce`s de manie`re gran-
ulaire. Notre solution est, au meilleur de nos connaissances, la premie`re a` regrouper
les trois e´le´ments cle´s des plateformes de stockage de donne´es ge´nomiques: chiffrement,
compression et efficacite´ de recherche. Nous montrons notamment que notre solution
re´duit l’espace de stockage requis de 18% par rapport aux standards existants.
Afin de permettre des analyses complexes de donne´es, nous proposons une solution
utilisant les techniques dites “secure multi-party computation” base´es sur les “garbled
circuits” afin de permettre un controˆle de la qualite´ des donne´es ge´nomiques distribue´es
sur de multiples sites, tout en respectant leur nature sensible. De tels controˆles sont
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une e´tape cruciale, pre´alable a` toute e´tude d’association des ge´nomes (GWAS). Notre
solution permet donc la collaboration entre chercheurs sur ces e´tudes en rendant pos-
sible le partage de donne´es ge´nomiques agre´ge´es, afin d’isoler des variations ge´ne´tiques
inte´ressantes dans l’e´tude de certaines maladies. Nous testons la faisabilite´ de ces solu-
tions lorsque des techniques cryptographiques re´centes sont employe´es afin de prote´ger
les donne´es et montrons quels parties de cette phase de controˆle peuvent en be´ne´ficier.
Avec les avance´es de la me´decine de pre´cision base´e sur les donne´es ge´nomiques,
le futur du “big data” apparaˆıt inexorablement lie´ au traitement massif des donne´es
ge´nomiques dans le “cloud”. Il est donc important de continuellement re´e´valuer les stan-
dards et pratiques dans ce secteur. En effet, la technologie se de´veloppe et des analyses
de plus en plus complexes deviennent possibles, mais ce progre`s est aussi accompagne´
de nouvelles menaces contre la se´curite´ de ces donne´es sensibles. Il s’agit d’un combat,
non seulement contre les pirates informatiques, mais aussi contre l’ignorance et les mau-
vaises pratiques en matie`re de se´curite´. Il est essentiel que des solutions inte´grables et
conside´rant la possibilite´ d’un usage abusif des donne´es soient propose´es, afin d’assurer
la se´curite´, l’efficacite´ du stockage, et la maximisation de l’utilite´ des donne´es dans la
pre´vention et le traitement des maladies.
Mots-cle´s : protection des donne´es ge´nomiques, calculs dans le “cloud”, attaque de
“brute-force”, chiffrement “honey”, compression, chiffrement respectant l’ordre, “secure
multi-party computation”, “differential privacy”, “garbled circuits”
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Due to major advances in genomic research and to the plummeting cost of high-
throughput sequencing, the use of human genomic data is rapidly expanding in vari-
ous domains, including healthcare (e.g., genomic-based personalized medicine), research
(e.g., genome-wide association studies), direct-to-consumer (DTC) services (e.g., ancestry
determination), legal cases (e.g., paternity tests), and forensics (e.g., criminal investiga-
tion). It is now possible for physicians to adjust the prescription of certain drugs based
on the genetic makeup of their patients, for individuals to learn about their genetic pre-
disposition to serious diseases, and for couples to find out if their potential offspring
has an increased likelihood of developing rare genetic diseases. These exciting use cases
come with tremendous economic potentials, which explains the success of many enter-
prises such as 23andMe and Color Genomics, and new services from major stakeholders
such as Google Genomics [1], IBM Watson [2], Microsoft Genomics [3], Apple Research
Kit [4], and Amazon AWS Genomics [5].
However, such a vast exploitation of genomic data raises critical privacy issues. Be-
cause genomic data includes valuable and sensitive information about individuals, leakage
of such data can have serious consequences, including discrimination (e.g., by a potential
employer), denial of services due to genetic predisposition (e.g., by an insurance com-
pany), or even blackmail (e.g., using sensitive paternity information). With the technol-
ogy becoming increasingly mature, these privacy concerns could lead to the humanity
nightmare that was depicted by the 1997 science fiction movie Gattaca. To benefit from
the aforementioned interesting biomedical services, individuals and even large medical
institutions tend to hand over the control of their data to third-party stakeholders who
might or might not protect the data properly. Although it is generally true that large
cloud-computing companies have better capabilities in protecting their system and data,
data breaches happen from time to time, either because the data is not properly en-
crypted or the key is stolen. For example, in 2013, 1 billion user accounts were hacked
in Yahoo’s database, where most of the information is not encrypted, including even
security questions that could be used to reset passwords [6]. Ironically, because large
databases are valuable attack targets, the world’s biggest data breaches often happen in
well-known companies that should have protected the data better than others [7]. If the
same failure happened with a genomic database, the consequences would be much worse.
As the security expert Bruce Schneier once said [8],
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If someone steals your password, you can change it. But if someone steals
your thumbprint, you can’t get a new thumb. The failure modes are very
different.
The argument holds for personal genomic data because this data is unique to every
human being. Even worse, users cannot control how companies will deal with their
personal genomic data after they sign general consent forms, e.g., when 23andMe sold
customers’ genetic data to another biotechnology company Genentech for 60 million
dollars [9].
Unfortunately, existing practices could lead to the abuse of genomic data; this abuse
is driven purely by economic interests. Indeed, due to the cost of security and privacy,
a privacy-preserving implementation might impair the performance and utility, which is
the reason why enterprises and institutions tend to go with easy and efficient solutions
for processing data. Historically, the initially insecure Internet has indeed survived from
numerous attacks, thanks to the gradually improving security deployment (e.g., from
HTTP to HTTPS ). Nevertheless, in the case of genomic data, as mentioned above,
the failure modes are different; once an individual’s genomic information is exposed, the
corresponding privacy is lost forever. Therefore, it is crucial to store and manage genomic
data in a privacy-preserving way in order to enable its secure use from the beginning.
Existing mechanisms for protecting the privacy of genomic data include (i)
anonymization, which has proven to be ineffective for genomic data [10, 11, 12], (ii)
adding noise to published genomic data or statistics for medical research (e.g., to guar-
antee differential privacy [13, 14, 15, 16]), (iii) cryptography (e.g., homomorphic encryp-
tion [17, 18], private set intersection [19], etc.), and (iv) trusted hardware ([20, 21, 22]).
In this thesis, in order to enable the secure use of genomic data, we propose various
defense mechanisms that depend on the functionality requirement, . These privacy-
conscious systems can de deployed under different scenarios, ranging from storage-only
applications to complicated statistical analysis. We implement these systems and demon-
strate that, with reasonable performance costs, they are scalable in real-life applications
with strong security and privacy guarantee.
1.1 Related Work
Because genomic information is highly personal, privacy has become a major concern as
these data become more widely generated, disseminated, and unwillingly exposed [113,
114]. For example, coarse-grained encryption and access control to genomic data could
lead to incidental findings that doctors often prefer to avoid [115]. Standard sample de-
identification has been proven insufficient for complete protection of genetic privacy [25].
Establishing a secure and privacy-preserving solution for genomic data storage is urgently
needed to facilitate the usage and transfer of the data. For example, storing sequence data
on a cloud is an attractive option, considering the size and the required availability of the
data [116, 117, 118]. However, access threats in this case are even more serious because
the data owner has to trust insiders on the cloud (e.g., the cloud administrator or high-
privileged system software). These concerns around genomic data and the corresponding
countermeasures have been extensively investigated by researchers in recent years [23].
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1.1.1 Statistical inference attacks and differential privacy
Homer et al. [11] show the possibility of inferring the participation of an individual in
a genotype database with the help of public allele frequencies. This work, known as
Homer’s attack, became a landmark for genomic privacy, due to its resulting widespread
fear that even sharing aggregate statistics is no longer safe. Afterwards, the NIH even
removed aggregate genomic data from open-access databases and urged the scientific
community to take precautions before sharing any aggregate GWAS data. Wang et
al. [12] give similar results of inference power based on p-values released in genome-wide
association studies. Various other statistical inference attacks have been proposed, which
makes the situation of genomic privacy more worrisome. These two attacks are typical
examples for the general category of statistical inference attacks on aggregate genomic
data, and a plethora of similar attacks have been proposed in the literature [134, 136,
137, 135, 133]. Hence, we wonder if it is even possible to protect against these attacks. In
response to the above concerns about published genomic statistics, Fienberg et al. [13]
propose to apply Laplacian noise to the released data to achieve differential privacy.
Another approach, using an exponential mechanism, to achieving differential privacy in a
genome-wide association study, is proposed by Johnson and Shmatikov [14]. Yu et al. [15]
present scalable privacy-preserving methods in genome-wide association studies that are
based on the Laplacian mechanism and an exponential mechanism. To further improve
the accuracy of the shared noisy data, Trame`r et al. [16] propose to relax differential
privacy by bounding the prior knowledge of potential attackers. In spite of these works on
differentially private genomic data, Fredrikson et al. [24] demonstrate an unsatisfactory
tradeoff between privacy and utility in an end-to-end case study of personalized dosing of
warfarin: after enforcing recommended level of differential privacy, the result is too noisy
to be used. A similar unsatisfactory result in an association study is also mentioned by
Erlich and Narayanan [25].
1.1.2 Computation on encrypted sensitive data
Apart from the family of solutions based on differential privacy, which turns out to be
criticized heavily by practitioners, many promising systems have been proposed in the
cryptography community. Jha et al. [26] design several privacy-preserving protocols for
some fundamental genomic computations (edit distance and Smith-Waterman score) that
use oblivious transfer and oblivious circuit evaluation. Kantarcioglu et al. [18] propose
the use of homomorphic encryption to store encrypted genomic sequence records in a
centralized repository and in a way that queries can be executed without decryption
and thus without violating participants’ privacy. Baldi et al. [19] propose a set of tech-
niques based on private set operations to address genomic privacy in several important
applications, namely, paternity tests, personalized medicine, and genetic compatibility
tests. To store and retrieve raw genomic data in a privacy-preserving manner, Ayday
et al. [17] introduce a framework that integrates stream ciphers and order-preserving
encryption. Other researchers also propose to protect privacy in genomic computation
by partitioning the computation through program specialization, according to the sen-
sitivity levels of different parts of the genome data [27]. The improvement of advanced
cryptographic techniques has helped to advance many other secure cloud computing so-
lutions [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36] that share similar cloud models to some extent
with the aforementioned systems. Nevertheless, in most cases, these solutions are based
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on heavy public-key cryptography, such as homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits,
which demands further research before they can be widely deployed in practice.
1.1.3 Trusted computing
In another direction, some researchers have begun to explore the possibility of employ-
ing trusted hardware for secure genomic computing in public clouds, thanks to several
breakthroughs in trusted computing, such as Intel’s Software Guard eXtension (SGX).
The most evident benefit of solutions in this dimension is the significant performance
gain, compared to the above advanced cryptographic solutions. Under the same system
and threat models, solutions have been proposed to address different genomic computing
problems [20, 21, 22]. In addition, several distributed computing systems based on Intel
SGX have been designed to solve more general big-data-processing problems [37, 38, 39].
It would be indeed encouraging if the same security and privacy could be achieved with
trusted hardware instead of heavy public-key cryptography; however, many researchers
raise concerns about its trust model and side-channel information leakage. For exam-
ple, multiple research groups show that it is practical to extract sensitive data from CPU
cache even though the main memory is encrypted [40, 41, 42, 43]. Moreover, attacking the
Intel processors was escalated in the start of 2018 [44], when several groups independently
found serious CPU vulnerabilities in Intel’s hardware [45, 46], further raising concerns
about the security promise of SGX. Therefore, it is unlikely that trusted computing will
be able to supplant advanced cryptographic solutions under all circumstances.
1.1.4 Honey encryption
There have been a number of practices of applying deception and decoys in the litera-
ture of computer security. Honeypots [86] are fake computer systems intended to bait
malicious actions that will be tracked and studied once these systems are probed or com-
promised. Honeypots are widely used in intrusion detection system [87, 88, 89]. Similarly,
a honeynet [90] is proposed to assist the system administrator in identifying malicious
traffic on the enterprise network.
The Kamouflage system [91] and honeywords [92] are designed to protect a password
vault by constructing plausible decoy passwords. Juels and Ristenpart [61] formalize such
a construction process with the concept of distribution-transforming encoder (DTE),
and propose honey encryption that provides security beyond the brute-force bound of
password-based encryption. As a formal extension to the above construction, Chatterjee
et al. [93] propose a design, called NoCrack, for crack-resistant password vaults using
honey encryption with natural language encoders. NoCrack shares the same motivation
with Chapter 2 of this thesis: When an attacker decrypts with the wrong password, it
gets a plausible-looking decoy, such that it does not know whether the password is indeed
wrong or not.
We improve honey encryption in this thesis by proposing a novel and useful DTE,
and apply the result to the protection of genomic data. To the best of our knowledge,
prior to this thesis, no cryptographic solution in genomic privacy addresses the challenge
of long-term threats to encryption, such as quantum computing [82], or of the common
short-term threat of brute-force cracking of password-based encryption [83, 84, 85].
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1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we investigate the problem of secure cloud computing for genomic
data. First, we start from the most basic system where only symmetric encryption is
needed for the storage of genomic data, then we propose a new solution that protects the
data against brute-force attacks that threaten the security of password-based encryption
in direct-to-consumer companies. Second, we analyze the scenario where efficient search-
ing on encrypted data is necessary. We propose a system that provides fast retrieval
on encrypted compressed data and that enables individuals to authorize access to fine-
grained regions during data retrieval. Finally, we explore various methods for enabling
readers to design privacy-conscious systems for complicated data analysis, with the fo-
cus on a proposal for secure quality control of genomic data by using secure multi-party
computation based on garbled circuits.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We propose a novel technique for securing genomic data against data breaches that
involve a computationally unbounded adversary (an essential requirement given the
longevity of genomic data). This is particularly useful in the case of password-based
encryption that is frequently used by direct-to-consumer services, where encryption
keys are derived from low-entropy user-chosen passwords. The solution employs a
symmetric encryption primitive called honey encryption, where plaintext messages
need to be transformed to a different space with uniform distribution on elements.
Such a transformation needs to be provably secure and efficient. We design and
analyze several distribution and transformation models for genome sequences, and
we present a formal security analysis of our proposed techniques. In addition,
we propose and analyze techniques for preventing an adversary from exploiting
side information (physical traits of victims) in order to decrypt genomes. We
implement our solution in Python and show that it is efficient, especially under a
parallel-processing environment.
2. In clinical genomics, the continuous evolution of bioinformatic algorithms and se-
quencing platforms makes it possible to store patients’ complete aligned genomic
data in addition to variant calls relative to a reference sequence. Due to the large
size of human genome-sequence data files (varying from 30 GB to 200 GB depend-
ing on coverage), genomics laboratories face two major challenges: the costs of
storage and the efficiency of the initial data processing. We present a privacy-
preserving solution for the secure storage of compressed aligned genomic data. Our
solution enables selective retrieval of encrypted data and improves the efficiency
of downstream analysis (e.g., variant calling). Compared with a previous de facto
standard solution for storing aligned genomic data, our solution uses 18% less
storage. Our solution maintains both efficient compression and downstream data
processing, and it provides unprecedented levels of security in genomic data stor-
age. Compared with previous work, the distinguishing features of our solution are
that (1) it is position-based instead of read-based, and (2) it enables random query-
ing of a sub-region in an encrypted file. Our method thus offers a space-saving,
privacy-preserving, and effective solution for the storage of clinical genomic data.
3. Due to the limited power of small-scale genome-wide association studies (GWAS),
in order to perform large-scale GWAS, researchers tend to collaborate and establish
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a larger consortium. Genome-wide association meta-analysis (GWAMA) is a statis-
tical tool that synthesizes results from multiple independent studies to increase the
statistical power and reduce false-positive findings of GWAS. We propose a secure
quality control protocol that enables the quality of data to be checked in a privacy-
preserving way without revealing sensitive information to a potential adversary.
Our solution employs state-of-the-art cryptographic and statistical techniques for
privacy protection. To demonstrate the efficiency and scalability on commodity
machines, we implement the solution in a meta-analysis pipeline with real data.
The distributed execution of our solution on a cluster of 128 cores for one million
genetic variants takes less than one hour, which is a modest cost considering the
10-month time span usually observed for the completion of the QC procedure that
includes timing of logistics. To end with a promising future for secure processing of
genomic data, we discuss multiple alternative solutions that might provide benefits
(e.g., high efficiency, low communication) under slightly different security and trust
models.
Before we go into the technical details, it is crucial to understand why the above
proposed systems in this thesis are superior to off-the-shelf techniques (e.g., from cryp-
tography) that are directly applicable for general data protection. First of all, some
special characteristics of genomic data might require researchers and developers to de-
sign new security primitives. For example, the aforementioned failure mode of genomic
data poses a long-term protection requirement in cloud storage, which motivates us to
design a new encryption scheme in Chapter 2 instead of using a conventional one that
is vulnerable to brute-force attacks. Secondly, during the design of these systems, it is
imperative to take existing practices into account so that the systems are usable and
appreciated by practitioners in the genomic and medical community. This actually pre-
vents us from directly applying off-the-shelf techniques for general data, because genomic
data are generally stored in well-structured format and are used in predefined ways that
might lead to unintended information leakage (Chapter 3) if the protection framework is
not crafted accordingly. Finally, many applications in medical research (e.g., statistical
analysis on protected data) demand research on advanced protection techniques, such
as secure multi-party computation and homomorphic encryption. During the design of
such systems, it is also crucial to combine various techniques for improving performance
and privacy, and to prove the security and privacy guarantee of such combination, e.g.,
the combination of parallel multi-party computation and differential privacy in Chapter
4.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Following the secure cloud-computing scenarios from storage to data analysis, we organize
this thesis as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the secure cloud storage for genomic data,
and propose a detailed encryption that provides resistance against brute-force attacks.
In Chapter 3, we extend the scenario to take data searching into account. We describe
a solution with efficient selective data retrieval. In Chapter 4, we focus on solutions that
encompass complicated data-analysis operations, at a cost of performance overhead, ac-
curacy loss, or weak trust model. We describe a secure multi-party computation solution
in detail.
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1.4 Publications
Chapter 2 is an extended version of [47]. Chapter 3 is an extension of [48]. Finally,
Chapter 4 rests on the results of [49]. I am thankful to the following collaborators who
made valuable contribution to these projects: Erman Ayday (Bilkent University), Raeka
S. Aiyar (Stanford University), Jacques Fellay (EPFL), Jean-Pierre Hubaux (EPFL), Ari
Juels (Cornell Tech), Zolta´n Kutalik (University Hospital Lausanne), Huang Lin (Applied
Science and Technology Research Institute), Adam Molyneaux (Sophia Genetics), Lars
M. Steinmetz (Stanford University), and Zhenyu Xu (Sophia Genetics).

Chapter 2
Securing storage of genomic data
Cloud storage is becoming more and more popular in people’s daily life, mostly thanks
to its promise of availability in any time and on any device. Moreover, considering the
scalability, efficiency and reliability provided by cloud services, many organizations adopt
cloud solutions for their IT work instead of building and maintaining the infrastructure
by themselves. According to the 2016 HIMSS Analytics Cloud Study [50] in United
States, 84% of the surveyed healthcare organizations are currently using cloud services,
25.6% of which fall into the public cloud computing model. In spite of privacy concerns,
healthcare organizations are ready to adopt public cloud storage, provided that the cloud
providers sign Business Associate Agreement (BAA) and offer HIPAA1-compliant ser-
vices, such as Google Cloud Drive, Microsoft OneDrive and Amazon [51]. Nevertheless,
when organizations and (especially) individual users place their data with cloud com-
puting services, they lose the complete control of that information. There have been
numerous cases and debates about whether cloud providers scan clients’ data [52]. For
example, Microsoft’s SkyDrive (now OneDrive) and Apple’s iCloud reserve the right to
scan users’ private files for content they deem “inappropriate”, which led to a number
of worrisome results [53, 54]. In this regard, many privacy-centric services start to bring
the control back to users while still enabling them to benefit from cloud storage. For
instance, SpiderOak [55] offers both cloud storage and a security option for users to
encrypt data before uploading. In addition, several third-party tools, such as Boxcryp-
tor and Odrive [56], enhance users with encryption functionality integrated in current
popular cloud storage providers (e.g., Google Drive, Dropbox). Finally, even for local
data protection, some companies offer software solutions to encrypt the database, such
as IBM’s DB2 [57] and Microsoft’s Access database [58]. In brief, these solutions are
mostly based on password-based encryption (PBE), where users choose passwords in or-
der to derive cryptographic keys for standard symmetric encryption such as 128-bit AES.
However, since keys are derived from passwords with lower entropy, the security level is
actually lower than the 128 bits indicated by the name.
Appropriately designed cryptographic schemes can preserve the utility of data, but
they provide security based on assumptions about the computational limitations of ad-
1HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996) is United States legislation
that provides data privacy and security provisions for safeguarding medical information.
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versaries. Hence they are vulnerable to brute-force attacks when these assumptions are
incorrect or erode over time. Given the longevity of genomic data, serious consequences
can result. A genome is (almost) stable over time and thus needs protection over the
lifetime of an individual and even beyond, as genomic data is correlated between the
members of a single family. It has been shown that the genome of an individual can be
probabilistically inferred from the genomes of his family members [59].
In many situations, though, particularly those involving direct use of data by con-
sumers, keys are weak and vulnerable to brute-force cracking even today. This problem
arises in systems that employ password-based encryption, a common approach to pro-
tection of user-owned data. Users’ tendency to choose weak passwords is widespread and
well documented [60].
Several years ago, Juels and Ristenpart introduced a new theoretical framework for
encryption called honey encryption (HE) [61]. Honey encryption has the property that
when a ciphertext is decrypted with an incorrect key (as guessed by an adversary), the
result is a plausible-looking yet incorrect plaintext. Therefore, HE gives encrypted data
an additional layer of protection by serving up fake data in response to every incorrect
guess of a cryptographic key or password. Notably, HE provides a hedge against brute-
force decryption in the long term, giving it a special value in the genomic setting.
However, HE relies on a highly accurate distribution-transforming encoder (DTE)
(Section 2.1.2) over the message space. Unfortunately, this requirement jeopardizes the
practicality of HE. To enable its use in any scenario, we have to understand the corre-
sponding message space quantitatively, that is, the precise probability of every possible
message. When messages are not uniformly distributed, characterizing and quantifying
the distribution is a highly non-trivial task. Building an efficient and precise DTE is
the main challenge when extending HE to a real use case, and it is what we do in this
chapter. Hopefully, the techniques proposed are not limited to genomic data; they are
intended to inspire those who want to apply HE to other scenarios, typically when the
data shares similar characteristics with genomic data.
In this chapter, we propose to address the problem of protecting genomic data by
combining the idea of honey encryption with the special characteristics of genomic data
in order to develop a secure genomic data storage (and retrieval) technique that is (i)
robust against potential data breaches, (ii) robust against a computationally unbounded
adversary, and (iii) efficient.
In the original paper [61], Juels and Ristenpart propose specific HE constructions that
rely on existing generation algorithms (e.g. for RSA private keys), or operate over very
simple message distributions (e.g., credit card numbers). These constructions, however,
are inapplicable to plaintexts with considerably more complicated structure, such as
genomic data. Thus substantially new techniques are needed in order to apply HE
to this case. Additional complications arise when the correlation between the genetic
variants (on the genome) and phenotypic side information are taken into account. This
chapter is devoted mainly to addressing these challenges.
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2.0.1 Overview
We propose a scheme called GenoGuard. In GenoGuard, genomic data is encoded,
encrypted under a patient’s password2, and stored at a centralized biobank. We propose
a novel tree-based technique to efficiently encode (and decode) the genomic sequence to
meet the special requirements of honey encryption. Legitimate users of the system can
retrieve the stored genomic data by typing their passwords.
A computationally unbounded adversary can break into the biobank protected by
GenoGuard, or remotely try to retrieve the genome of a victim. The adversary could
exhaustively try all the potential passwords in the password space for any genome in
the biobank. However, for each password he tries, the adversary will obtain a plausible-
looking genome without knowing whether it is the correct one. We also consider the
case when the adversary has side information about a victim (or victims) in terms of his
physical traits. In this case, the adversary could use genotype-phenotype associations to
determine the real genome of the victim. GenoGuard is designed to prevent such attacks,
hence it provides protections beyond the normal guarantees of HE.
GenoGuard is highly efficient and can be used by the service providers that offer DTC
services (e.g., 23andMe) to securely store the genomes of their customers. It can also be
used by medical units (e.g., hospitals) to securely store the genomes of patients and to
retrieve them later for clinical use.
2.1 Background
In this section, we briefly introduce some basic concepts of genomics, as well as the honey
encryption scheme [61]. To facilitate future references, frequently used notation is listed
in Table 2.1.
2.1.1 Genomics
Genetic Locus, Allele, and Single Nucleotide Variant
In this chapter, we consider a genetic locus (plural loci) as a position on a chromosome.
One of a number of alternative forms at a given locus is called an allele. Most of the
genome is conserved, in comparison to the reference human sequence, in any given in-
dividual. The most abundant type of genetic variants are single nucleotide variants
(SNVs), in which different alleles are observed at the same chromosomal position. Only
about 4 million SNVs are observed per individual; they represent the sensitive informa-
tion that should be protected. In most cases, there are two alleles at a locus, a major
allele, which is observed with a high frequency in the population, and a minor allele,
which is observed with low frequency. The frequency of an allele in a given population is
denoted as the allele frequency (AF). An allele takes a value from the set {A, T,C,G}.
We represent a major allele as 0, and a minor allele as 1. Human chromosomes are
inherited in pairs, one from the father and the other from the mother, hence each SNV
position has a pair of alleles (nucleotides). For example, the i-th SNV (on the DNA se-
quence) can be represented as SNVi = xy, where x (and y) is an allele. As the ordering
of x and y does not matter, we represent the value of an SNVi from the set {0, 1, 2},
2A patient can choose a low-entropy password that is easier for him/her to remember, which is a
common case in the real world [60].
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M sequence (plaintext) space
M a sequence (message), M ∈M
n number of SNVs in M
S seed space
K key space
C ciphertext space
pk key (password) distribution
pm original message distribution
pd DTE message distribution
h storage overhead parameter
A the adversary against the DTE scheme
Advdte
DTE,pm(A) adversary A’s advantage of distinguish-
ing pm from pd
B the adversary against the HE scheme
Advmr
HE,pm,pk
(B) adversary B’s advantage of recovering
the correct sequence
Table 2.1: Notations and definitions for Chapter 2.
based on the number of minor alleles it has. For example, if locus i has major allele A
and minor allele G, we represent AA as 0, AG (or GA) as 1, GG as 2.
Diploid Genotype and Haploid Genotype
To be consistent throughout the chapter, given a sequence of loci, we interpret an indi-
vidual’s diploid genotype as a corresponding sequence of SNVs, each of which takes
values in {0, 1, 2}, and a haploid genotype as a corresponding sequence of alleles, each
of which takes values in {0, 1}.
Linkage Disequilibrium and Recombination
Because chromosomal segments are inherited as blocks, SNVs on a sequence are usually
correlated, especially when they are physically close to each other. This correlation is
measured by linkage disequilibrium (LD) [62]. The strength of LD between two SNVs
is usually represented by r2, where r2 = 1 represents the strongest LD relationship. At
meiosis, two DNA sequences exchange genetic information, leading to a novel combination
of alleles that is passed on to the progeny. This process is called recombination. The
recombination rates vary on the different regions of a chromosome.
2.1.2 Honey Encryption
Honey encryption [61] is a recently proposed encryption scheme that has the advantage of
providing security beyond the brute-force bound over conventional ciphers. In our case,
this is a highly desirable property, considering the longevity of genomic data. Suppose
a message M is sampled from a distribution pm over the message space M and honey
encrypted under key K ∈ K to yield a ciphertext C ∈ C. Decryption under an incorrect
key K ′ 6= K yields a fake message M′ also from the distribution pm. In a conventional
cipher, when decrypting a ciphertext using a wrong key, the scheme usually produces an
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invalid3 message (often denoted by special symbol ⊥); thus the adversary can easily elim-
inate wrong keys via a brute-force attack. However, in honey encryption, the adversary
does not have such an advantage because the output of the decryption under a wrong
key is equivalent to random sampling from pm. Honey encryption is proposed with a
notion called distribution-transforming encoder (DTE), as we briefly describe below.
Distribution-Transforming Encoder: A DTE works by transforming the potentially
non-uniform message distribution pm into a uniform distribution over a seed space S.
Formally, it is a pair of algorithms represented as DTE = (encode, decode): encode takes
as input a messageM and outputs a value in S, whereas decode takes as input a value in S
and outputs a message. encode is probabilistic: A message M can potentially be mapped
to one of many possible values that make up a set SM ⊆ S, and SM 6= ∅. For any pair of
different messages M and M′ (where M 6= M′), SM ∩ SM′ = ∅. Moreover,
⋃
M∈M SM = S.
Therefore, encode needs to choose a value randomly in SM when transforming M, but
decode is deterministic. A good DTE has the property that a randomly selected seed,
mapped to the message space, yields roughly the underlying message distribution pm (
|SM|
|S| ≈ pm(M)), where pm(M) is the probability of message M. We further discuss the
benefits of this property in Section 2.4.
In the DTE-then-encrypt paradigm proposed in [61], encryption of a message M in-
volves two steps: (i) application of encode to M to yield a seed s, and then (ii) encryption
of s under a conventional symmetric cipher SE. HE does not provide IND-CCA (indis-
tinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack) security. It provides the weaker but still
useful property of message-recovery (MR) security, described below and formally defined
in Section 2.4. Consider the scenario in which an adversary wants to guess the key (K)
used for the encryption. Given an ideal cipher model for SE, a randomly selected key
corresponds to a permutation selected uniformly at random. Hence, if the adversary
tries to decrypt a ciphertext C with a randomly guessed key K ′, he will obtain a value
uniformly sampled from S. If he decodes this value, the output message is equivalent
to one sampled from the distribution pm. Given a good DTE, the adversary cannot
distinguish a correct key K from an incorrect one K ′ with a significant advantage over
guessing the key (without knowledge of the ciphertext).
We use the DTE-then-encrypt construction in honey encryption. The setup is de-
scribed as follows:
• Let pm denote the distribution over the message space M, pk denote the distribu-
tion over the key (password) space K, S = {0, 1}l denote the seed space with bit
length l, and C denote the ciphertext space.
• Let DTE = (encode, decode) be a DTE scheme. Specifically, encode(M) = S and
decode(S) = M, where M is a message and S ∈ S.
• Use a conventional symmetric encryption scheme SE = (encrypt, decrypt) with
plaintext space S and ciphertext space C. For block ciphers without padding, C
is the same as S. SE uses random bits uniformly sampled from {0, 1}B during
encryption, where B is the length of the random bits.
The honey encryption construction HE[DTE, SE] = (HEnc,HDec) is also shown in Figure
2.1. However, as we will show, the application of HE to genomes, is far from straightfor-
3Here “invalid” means a message with an extremely low probability in pm.
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HEnc(K,M)
S ← $ encode(M)
r ← $ {0, 1}B
C ← $ encrypt(K,S, r)
return (r, C)
HDec(K, (r, C))
S ← decrypt(K,C, r)
M← decode(S)
return M
Figure 2.1: DTE-then-encrypt construction using a symmetric encryption. M ∈M,K ∈
K, S ∈ S, and C ∈ C. The symbol ‘$’ implies randomness of the function. r is a random
salt of length B.
ward. Constructing a good DTE for genetic sequences, one that yields an HE scheme with
good MR security bounds, is the main challenge addressed in this chapter. Addressing
the problem of side information is also a significant challenge.
2.2 System Model
We consider a scenario where individuals’ genomic data is stored in a database (e.g., a
biobank) and used for various purposes, such as clinical diagnosis or therapy, or DTC
services. In the data collection phase, patients provide their biological samples to a
certified institution (CI) that is responsible for the sequencing. Furthermore, each patient
also chooses a password (we assume patients can choose low-entropy passwords). The CI
pre-processes the sequence data; the most important step is the application of protection
mechanisms to the data, such as encryption using the passwords of the patients. The CI
then sends the processed data to the biobank. To efficiently protect the data, we assume
there are two layers of protection:
• The inner-layer protection is provided by using cryptographic techniques. This
layer is necessary for defending against attacks from insiders or someone who hacks
into the system and steals the database. This is the focus of this chapter.
• The outer-layer protection is the access control; it decides various permissions on
the data. Access control has been extensively investigated in the literature [63] and
is out of the scope of this chapter.
During data retrieval, a user (such as a doctor or the patient himself) first authenticates
himself to the system using a passcode4, or biometric information (e.g., face). After
authentication, the user can send a data request to the biobank that processes the request
according to access control rules and the biobank responds with the authorized data.
Figure 2.2 gives an overview of the considered architecture.
2.2.1 Genomic Data Representation
We represent each patient’s genomic data as a sequence of genetic variants (SNVs) that
take values from the set {0, 1, 2}, as we discussed before. We assume a sequence M with
4Chosen by the user or generated by a one-time passcode generator. Note that the passcode used
for authentication cannot be the same as the password used for PBE (if PBE is used in GenoGuard that
is introduced in Section 2.3), as the former would require storing a hash of the passcode on the system.
2.3. GENOGUARD 15
Certified 
Institution 
(CI) 
Alice 
Bob 
Cathy 
Eva 
Data 
Collection 
Data Preprocessing 
Users 
Data 
Retrieval 
Biobank 
Access control 
Figure 2.2: System model of genomic data storage and retrieval. Patients provide their
samples to CI for sequencing. Encrypted sequence data is sent to the biobank and
retrieved for various purposes by the users.
n SNVs, and we represent such a sequence as (m1,m2, · · · ,mn), where mi represents
an SNV. We use Mi,j to represent the subsequence including all the SNVs between (and
including) the i-th and the j-th.
2.2.2 Threat Model
We assume the CI to be trusted in order to perform sequencing on patients’ samples.
An adversary can be anyone (except the CI) who has access to the protected data,
such as the biobank, a user who has been granted access permission on part of the
data, or an attacker who breaks into the biobank and downloads a snapshot of the
database. As a consequence, the adversary can be assumed to have a copy of encrypted
sequences. We further assume that the adversary has access to public knowledge about
genomics, i.e., AF, LD, recombination and mutation rates. A stronger adversary could
even have some side information about a given patient, such as his phenotype, and
even some of his SNVs. We represent the adversary’s background knowledge as BK =
{AF,LD, recombination and mutation rates, [side info]}, where “[side info]” means the
type and amount of side information depend on the power of an adversary. We also
study the effect of phenotype as side information (in Section 2.5) and propose a general
solution in this regard. We emphasize that more side information could result in stronger
attacks. Throughout this chapter, we assume a computationally unbounded adversary
who has the capability to efficiently enumerate all keys in K and to use them to decrypt
the data, also called a brute-force attack. We also assume that the adversary is honest-
but-curious (i.e., follows the protocols honestly, but tries to learn more information than
he is authorized for). The adversary’s main goal is to break the inner-layer protection
and gain access to the plaintext sequences of the patients.
2.3 GenoGuard
We describe GenoGuard, our solution based on honey encryption, for the secure storage
of genomic data. We show the main steps of the protocol in Figure 2.3. We represent
the patient and the user as two separate entities, but they can be the same individual,
depending on the application. We discuss more about the application scenarios in Sec-
tion Section 2.6. Step by step, we discuss the protocol in this section, emphasizing the
encoding (Step 3) and decoding (Step 9) steps that are the major features of GenoGuard.
Initially, a patient provides his biological sample (e.g., blood or saliva) to the CI
and chooses a password that is used for the encryption (Step 1). The CI does the
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sequencing on the sample and produces genomic data represented as discussed in Section
2.2.1 (Step 2).
CI User 
Biobank 
1. Sample, Password 
2. Sequencing 
3. Encoding 
4. Password-based encryption 
5. Ciphertext 
6. Request 
7. Ciphertext 
8. Password-based decryption 
9. Decoding 
Patient 
Figure 2.3: GenoGuard protocol. A patient provides his biological sample to the CI,
and chooses a password for honey encryption. The CI does the sequencing, encoding
and password-based encryption, and then sends the ciphertext to the biobank. During a
retrieval, a user (e.g., the patient or his doctor) requests for the ciphertext, decrypts it
and finally decodes it to get the original sequence.
2.3.1 Encoding
We introduce a novel DTE scheme that can be applied efficiently on genome sequences.
The general idea is to estimate the conditional probability of an SNV given all preceding
ones. In other words, the proposed scheme estimates P (mi|M1,i−1), the conditional prob-
ability of the i-th SNV given preceding SNVs. The probability of a complete sequence
M can be decomposed as follows:
pm(M) = P (mn|M1,n−1)P (mn−1|M1,n−2) · · ·P (m2|m1)P (m1). (2.1)
The main challenge is to find an efficient way to encode a sequence M into a uni-
formly distributed seed, which defines the deterministic mapping from M to SM (then
we can uniformly pick a value from SM). A naive and impractical method would be to
enumerate all possible sequences, compute their corresponding probabilities, calculate
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of each sequence in a pre-defined order, and
finally assign the corresponding portion of seeds to a sequence. However, given that there
are three possible states for each SNV on a sequence of length n, this method incurs both
time and space complexity of O(3n).
Therefore, we propose a novel approach for efficiently encoding such a sequence. The
approach works by assigning subspaces of S to the prefixes of a sequence M. The prefixes
of a sequence M are all the subsequences in the set {M1,i|1 ≤ i ≤ n}. For example, the
prefixes of the sequence ATTCG are {A,AT,ATT,ATTC,ATTCG}. We first describe the
basic setup as follows:
• Seed space S corresponds to the interval [0, 1). Each seed is a real number in this
interval. In practice, we need to use only sufficient precision (l bits as indicated by
the definition S = {0, 1}l) to distinguish between the seeds of different sequences.
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• If mi+1 = 1, go to the middle branch and attach an interval [L3j+1i+1 , U3j+1i+1 ) =
[Lji+(U
j
i −Lji )×P (mi+1 = 0|M1,i), Lji+(U ji −Lji )×(P (mi+1 = 0|M1,i)+P (mi+1 =
1|M1,i))).
• If mi+1 = 2, go to the right branch and attach an interval [L3j+2i+1 , U3j+2i+1 ) = [Lji +
(U ji − Lji )× (P (mi+1 = 0|M1,i) + P (mi+1 = 1|M1,i)), U ji ).
So far, we have not devoted much content to the discussion of computing the con-
ditional probability P (mi+1|M1,i), which will be elaborated later. For now, we focus
on how the encoding scheme works on the high level. Finally, when we reach the leaf
node with the interval [Ljn, U
j
n), we pick a seed S uniformly from this range to encode
the corresponding sequence. In the following, we give a toy example of this encoding
process.
Example (Encoding): Suppose all sequences are of length 3. The sequence M that
needs to be encoded is (0, 2, 1). Assume P (m1 = 0) = 0.6, P (m2 = 2|m1 = 0) = 0.1, and
P (m3 = 1|M1,2) = 0.3. The encoding process is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
In Step 4 (in Figure 2.3), after the encoding is finished, the seed, as a plaintext, is
fed into a conventional password-based encryption (PBE) [64] by using the password
chosen by the patient (at Step 1). This step is a direct application of PBE, so we
skip the details here. The encrypted seed is then sent to the biobank (step 5) that,
as a centralized database, receives requests (step 6) from users and responds with the
corresponding encrypted data (step 7).
2.3.2 Decoding
When an encrypted seed is sent to the user, the user first performs a password-based
decryption by using the patient’s password (step 8). As discussed, the user could be
the patient himself, or the patient can provide his password on behalf of the user. We
discuss more on these scenarios in Section 2.6. Once the user has the plaintext seed, the
decoding process (step 9) is the same as the encoding process. Given a seed S ∈ [0, 1),
at each step, the algorithm computes three intervals for the three branches, chooses the
interval in which the seed S falls, and goes down along the ternary tree. Once it reaches
a leaf node, it outputs the path from the root to this leaf with all chosen SNVs.
2.3.3 Moving to Finite Precision
As we mentioned, the current seed space S is a real number domain with infinite precision.
However, considering the size of a DNA sequence, with infinite precision, we could end
up having a very long floating-point representation for a sequence, which could cause a
high storage overhead. Also, we cannot afford to enumerate all possible sequences to find
the smallest precision to represent all the corresponding real numbers. Moreover, if we
work with finite precision and decide on the precision a priori (without enumerating the
sequences), this could result in an inaccurate representation of the sequence distribution,
thus causing a security loss. In this subsection, we describe how our proposed DTE
scheme can be implemented with finite precision and with negligible effect on security.
For a sequence of length n, with each SNV taking three possible values, we require
at least (n · log2 3) bits to store the sequence.5 To optimally implement the scheme, we
5We do not consider compression techniques here.
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first select a storage overhead parameter h (h > log2 3). We use hn bits to encode one
sequence. As before, the algorithm works by segmenting intervals based on conditional
probabilities. In this case, however, an interval is represented by integers, and not by
real numbers of infinite precision. The root interval is [0, 2hn − 1]. To better describe
the scheme, suppose (during the encoding) we reach the j-th node at depth i on the
tree (the root has depth 0 and the leaves have depth n). The interval of this node is
denoted by [Lji , U
j
i ] (U
j
i inclusive, which is different from the infinite-precision case). The
segmentation rules are described in the following.
We compute the conditional probabilities for the three branches, PL (left branch),
PC (middle branch) and PR (right branch) respectively. Without loss of generality, we
assume the three probabilities are ordered as PL ≥ PC ≥ PR (the following algorithm is
similar for different orderings). We initialize a variable avail = U ji − Lji + 1 to denote
the size of the seed space available for allocation. The sizes of seed space that will be
allocated to the three branches are denoted by allocL (left branch), allocC (middle
branch), and allocR (right branch). Note that allocL+ allocC + allocR = U
j
i −Lji +1.
The algorithm advances as follows:
(i). If PR <
3n−i−1
avail
, then allocR = 3
n−i−1, otherwise allocR = ⌈PR · avail⌉. Then, we
update avail as avail = avail− allocR.
(ii). If PCPC+PL <
3n−i−1
avail
, then allocC = 3
n−i−1, otherwise allocC = ⌈PC · avail⌉. And,
we set allocL = avail− allocC .
(iii). Finally, we set the three sub-intervals as:
• [L3ji+1, U3ji+1] = [Lji , Lji + allocL − 1];
• [L3j+1i+1 , U3j+1i+1 ] = [Lji + allocL, Lji + allocL + allocC − 1];
• [L3j+2i+1 , U3j+2i+1 ] = [Lji + allocL + allocC , U ji ].
The intuition behind the above conditions is that we need to allocate at least one
integer (seed) for one sequence. To ensure this, when we want to move down to a branch,
we need to guarantee that the size of the seed space allocated for this branch is not smaller
than the total number of sequences belonging to this branch. The requirement is satisfied
from the beginning by setting the root interval as [0, 2hn − 1] and never violated in the
algorithm. This method causes a deviation from the original sequence distribution. In
Section 2.4, we quantify the security loss due to such deviation and prove that it is
negligible.
2.3.4 Modeling Genome Sequences
To compute the conditional probabilities in Equation (2.1) efficiently, we introduce several
models and compare their goodness of fit in real genome datasets.
Modeling with linkage disequilibrium and allele frequency
With LD and AF, we can compute the joint probability of two SNVs, P (mi,mj). How-
ever, to compute the conditional probability P (mi+1|M1,i), we have to simplify the model
(Equation (2.1)) because public LD values are always given pairwise in the literature.
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Although there could be multiple pairwise LD relations for SNVi+1, we adopt the follow-
ing heuristic method: We consider only the previous SNV that has the strongest LD with
SNVi+1. Such an LD usually occurs between neighboring SNVs on the DNA sequence,
hence we have P (mi+1|M1,i) ≈ P (mi+1|mi) = P (mi+1,mi)P (mi) . This is the first-order Markov
chain that was considered also in genomics [65].
This model fails to capture the correlation between distant SNVs. However, we argue
that it approximates the genome sequence model better than the uniform distribution
model used in conventional encryption, as we will see later in model comparison with
real datasets.
Modeling by building k-th-order Markov chains on a dataset
With this method, we assume the correlation in a genome sequence can be captured by
a k-th-order Markov chain, where the conditional probability of SNVi+1 depends on the
k preceding SNVs. In other words, we estimate the conditional probability as
P (mi+1|M1,i) ≈ P (mi+1|Mi−k+1,i). (2.2)
Researchers have tried to build such a genetic Markov model in a different context [66].
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no public data (like LD) available for
these models. In a similar manner, we build the k-th-order Markov model on a real
dataset, for different k values. Assume the dataset has N sequences. We use F (Mi,j) to
represent the frequency of subsequence Mi,j between SNVs i and j in the dataset. The
k-th-order Markov model is built by computing
P (mi+1|Mi−k+1,i) =
{
0 if F (Mi−k+1,i) = 0,
F (Mi−k+1,i+1)
F (Mi−k+1,i)
if F (Mi−k+1,i) > 0.
(2.3)
Due to the constraint of the dataset size, k normally can only take small values to
avoid overfitting of the model. For example, in HapMap diploid genotype datasets, N is
smaller than 200 for each population. For k = 3, there are 81 possible configurations for
Mi−k+1,i+1, which makes the average frequency for each configuration quite small, hence
the model has modest statistical significance due to this sparsity problem. We introduce
this model as a possible direction and use it to emphasize the importance of higher-order
correlation, which will be shown in the evaluation. The k-th-order Markov chain serves
as a bridge to the next more promising model.
Modeling with recombination rates
Although higher-order Markov models might better model genome sequences, these mod-
els seem unlikely to be practical because of the difficulty of accurately estimating all the
necessary parameters in available datasets. Inspired by the modeling method used by
Li and Stephens [67], we can address the problem from a different viewpoint. Given a
set of k existing haploid genotypes {h1, h2, ..., hk}, another haploid genotype hk+1 to be
observed is an imperfect mosaic of h1, h2, ..., hk, due to genetic recombination and mu-
tation (Figure 2.5). This reproduction process is actually a hidden Markov model with
a sequence of n states (the number of loci in a haploid genotype):
• Markov chain states: State j, Xj , can take a value from 1 to k, representing
the original haploid genotype for locus j;
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copy copy copy mutate 
?? ?? ?? 
?? 
Figure 2.5: An example showing how the haploid genotype h4 is interpreted as an imper-
fect mosaic of a given set of haploid genotypes {h1, h2, h3}, based on recombination and
mutation. Each haploid genotype can be as long as the whole genome, but we show only
four loci here to explain the idea. White circle means allele 0 for that locus, whereas
black circle means allele 1. The first allele of haploid genotype h4 is copied from h1.
Though the second allele comes from h3, it mutates to a different allele. The third allele
is copied from h2, and the fourth is copied from h1. Note that this shows just one possible
process to get h4 from {h1, h2, h3}, and as there are many other possibilities, the task
of this model is to compute the probability of observing h4 by taking all the possible
underlying processes into account, which constitutes a hidden Markov model.
• Symbol emission probabilities: hi,j denotes the allele (0 or 1) at locus j in
haploid genotype i. To produce hk+1, at state j, an allele hk+1,j is output with a
certain probability, depending on the allele of the original haploid genotype (Xj)
and the mutation rate;
• Transition probabilities: Transition probabilities from state j to state j + 1
depend on the recombination rate between locus j and j + 1.
With this model, we can compute the probability of a haploid genotype hk+1, that
is, P (hk+1|h1, ..., hk). The computation is done with the well-known forward-backward
algorithm for hidden Markov models [68]. The probability of a genome sequence M,
which is the coupling of two haploid genotypes, can be computed similarly by extending
this hidden Markov model so that state j will take a value pair (X1j , X
2
j ), where X
1
j
denotes the first original haploid genotype and X2j denotes the second. Such an extension
technique has been detailed in a genotype imputation scenario [69]. The conditional
probability P (mi+1|M1,i) can then be computed in the intermediate steps of the forward
algorithm. Details are specified as follows.
Initially, at state 1, we have P (X1 = x) =
1
k (x ∈ {1, · · · , k}). The transition proba-
bility from state j to j + 1 is characterized by
P (Xj+1 = x
′|Xj = x)
=

exp(−
ρj
k ) +
1−exp(−
ρj
k
)
k if x
′ = x;
1−exp(−
ρj
k
)
k otherwise,
(2.4)
where ρj is the genetic distance between locus j and j + 1. It is computed based on the
recombination rate between these two loci. Intuitively, a smaller genetic distance will
make the two states more likely to take the same value, meaning that they are more
likely to come from the same haploid genotype.
22 CHAPTER 2. SECURING STORAGE OF GENOMIC DATA
At state j, an allele (0 or 1) will be emitted. To mimic the effects of mutation, the
emitting probability is characterized by
P (hk+1,j = a|Xj = x) =
{
1− λ if hx,j = a;
λ otherwise,
(2.5)
where a is 0 or 1, and λ is the mutation rate.
Let the forward variable αj(x) = P (hk+1,≤j , Xj = x). Then α1(x) = P (hk+1,1|X1 =
x)P (X1 = x). And α2(x), · · · , αn(x) can be computed recursively using
αj+1(x) =P (hk+1,j+1|Xj+1 = x)
k∑
x′=1
αj(x
′)P (Xj+1 = x|Xj = x′),
(2.6)
The probability of a complete haploid genotype is then computed using
P (hk+1|h1, · · · , hk) =
k∑
x=1
αn(x). (2.7)
The conditional probability for allele j+1, given all preceding alleles, is computed using
P (hk+1,j+1|hk+1,≤j , h1, · · · , hk) =
∑k
x=1 αj+1(x)∑k
x=1 αj(x)
. (2.8)
For a genome sequence that couples two haploid genotypes, all the above quantities
can be computed similarly by an extension of this hidden Markov model [69].
The correlation between two SNVs, which is considered in the previous two models,
is essentially the result of recombination in genome sequences. With this recombination
model, we are able to capture the high-order correlation efficiently, without having to
estimate a large number of parameters.
Goodness of fit of the models
To evaluate the models, we used different types of real genomic datasets from HapMap,
for the population CEU (Utah residents with Northern and Western European ancestry
from the CEPH collection) [70], including:
• A diploid genotype dataset that contains 165 individuals, each having 22 pairs of
autosomes (different from sex chromosomes that are discussed in Section 2.5.1).
The shortest chromosome contains 17304 SNVs, whereas the longest one contains
102157 SNVs;
• A haploid genotype dataset that contains 234 haploid genotypes, each of which
has the same sequence of loci as that in the diploid genotype dataset on the 22
chromosomes;
• Allele frequency and linkage disequilibrium datasets for each chromosome;
• Recombination rates for each chromosome.
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naturally caused by the underlying recombination mechanism. Moreover, the model is
stable across all tests and cannot be rejected, even at the significance level of 0.2 in every
chromosome, which shows a good fit of this model on real datasets. Therefore, we keep
this model for our scheme.
2.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove the security of our proposed DTE scheme, with regard to the
scheme in finite precision.
Once the algorithm allocates seed space of size 3n−i−1 to a branch at step i (as in
Section 2.3.3), each following step simply segments an input interval into three parts
of equal size. Hence there is only one seed for each sequence in the sub-tree under the
branch of step i. As discussed in Section 2.3.3, in such a case, the subinterval of the jth
node at depth i of the tree will contain 3n−i−1 integers that are exactly the number of
sequences under that branch.
The goal in constructing a DTE is that decode applied to uniform points (in the seed
space) provides sampling close to that of the target distribution pm; this is the sequence
distribution produced by the kth-order Markov chain. The seed space S is the integer
interval [0, 2hn− 1] (i.e., l = hn). We define pd to be the DTE message distribution over
M by
pd(M) = P [M
′ = M : S ← $ S;M′ ← decode(S)].
The additional security provided by honey encryption depends on the difference between
pm and pd. Intuitively, pm and pd are “close” in a secure DTE. Next, we quantify this
difference for the proposed DTE scheme. Let P im be the original probability of the prefix
sequence M1,i, namely, P
i
m =
∑
M
′∈M
M
′
1,i=M1,i
pm(M
′). We define P id similarly in the distribution
pd.
We prove the following lemma that gives an upper bound on the difference between
the original message distribution pm and the DTE message distribution pd.
Lemma 2.1. ∀M ∈M, |pm(M)− pd(M)| < 12(h−log2 3)n .
Proof. As we showed in the optimized scheme, the goal is to compute three intervals
according to the conditional probabilities for the three branches, PL (left branch), PC
(middle branch) and PR (right branch), respectively. Without loss of generality, we
assume the three probabilities are ordered as PL ≥ PC ≥ PR. The proof is similar for
different orderings.
First consider the case when pd(M) > pm(M). According to the algorithm, the
probability of sequence M increases in pd only if it has at least one SNV that belongs to
the right branch or the middle branch. In other words, when we set allocR = 3
n−i−1
(allocC = 3
n−i−1) or allocR = ⌈PR ·avail⌉ (allocC = ⌈PC ·avail⌉), we actually increase
the probability for this branch. Without loss of generality, we prove for the right branch
in the following, but it is similar for the middle branch.
If allocR = 3
n−i−1 has been executed at some step, as we mentioned, there will be
only one integer assigned for each sequence under that branch. The probability of one
integer in S is 1
2hn
. Hence, the probability of sequence M will be increased by at most
1
2hn
.
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Otherwise, the increased probability is only due to allocR = ⌈PR · avail⌉, coming
from the “ceiling” operation that expands the interval by at most one additional integer.
In this case, we need to show that
∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , n}, P id − P im ≤
i
2hn
. (2.10)
When i = 0, there is no prefix and P 0d = P
0
m = 1, and hence the result holds. Also,
for i <= k, the result holds. When i = k + 1, P k+1m = P
k
m · PR. The right sub-interval
has size allocR = ⌈PR · (U jk − Ljk + 1)⌉. Then we have
P k+1d =
⌈PR · (U jk − Ljk + 1)⌉
2hn
≤ PR · (U
j
k − Ljk + 1) + 1
2hn
= P kd · PR +
1
2hn
.
(2.11)
Hence, ∀i >= 0, 2i > i
P k+1d − P k+1m = P kd · PR − P km · PR +
1
2hn
≤ k
2hn
· PR + 1
2hn
<
k + 1
2hn
.
(2.12)
Therefore, we have pd(M)− pm(M) = Pnd − Pnm ≤ n2hn < 2
n
2hn
= 1
2(h−log2 3)n
.
If pd(M) < pm(M), we need to show that pd(M) − pm(M) > − 12(h−1)n . Consider the
smallest depth i which makes P id < P
i
m. Let P
i
d = P
i
m − ǫ0, where ǫ0 ≥ 0. In the
previous step, the algorithm must have chosen the left branch (or the middle branch),
otherwise P id will continue to be larger than P
i
m. We only prove for the left branch whose
probability will decrease the most.6 Then, we have
P id ≥ P i−1d · PL −
3n−i · 2
2hn
≥ P i−1m · PL −
3n−i · 2
2hn
= P im −
3n−i · 2
2hn
,
(2.13)
and hence ǫ0 <
3n−i·2
2hn
.
We define P i+kd = P
i+k
m − ǫk. Now, we will show that ǫk <
∑k
j=0
3n−i−j ·2
2hn
. Clearly,
the result holds for k = 0. Going from depth i+ k to i+ k + 1, we have
P i+k+1d ≥ P i+kd · PL −
3n−i−k−1 · 2
2hn
> (P i+km − ǫk) · PL −
3n−i−k−1 · 2
2hn
> P i+k+1m −
k+1∑
j=0
3n−i−j · 2
2hn
.
(2.14)
Hence,
pd(M)− pm(M) = −ǫn−i > −
n−i∑
j=0
3n−i−j · 2
2hn
> −
n−1∑
j=0
3n−1−j · 2
2hn
> − 1
2(h−log2 3)n
.
(2.15)
6The result also holds for the middle branch whose probability can decrease (or increase), but not
as much as the left branch (or the right branch).
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SAMP1A
DTE
M∗ ← pm M
S∗ ← $ encode(M∗)
b← $ A(M∗, S∗)
return b
SAMP0A
DTE
S∗ ← $ S
M∗ ← decode(S∗)
b← $ A(M∗, S∗)
return b
Figure 2.7: Game defining the DTE advantage. In SAMP1A
DTE
, sequence M∗ is sampled
according to pm, whereas in SAMP0
A
DTE
, M∗ is equivalently sampled according to pd.
The adversary’s output b is 0 or 1, indicating his guess on whether he is in SAMP0A
DTE
or SAMP1A
DTE
.
The above proof shows that, for a given sequence M with original probability pm(M),
the corresponding probability pd(M) in the DTE model (Section 2.3.3) can increase or
decrease at most by 1
2(h−log2 3)n
, which is useful to prove a negligible adversary advantage
in later theorems (Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.1). 
Lemma 2.1 bounds the largest difference between pm(M) and pd(M). It gives rise
to the following important theorem that bounds the DTE advantage of an adversary,
introduced by honey encryption. The DTE advantage is formally defined by the following
definition.
Definition 2.1. Let A be an adversary attempting to distinguish between the two games
shown in Figure 2.7. The advantage of A for the sequence distribution pm and encoding
scheme DTE = (encode, decode) is
Advdte
DTE,pm(A) = |P [SAMP1ADTE ⇒ 1]− P [SAMP0ADTE ⇒ 1]|.
Theorem 2.1. Let pm be the sequence distribution and DTE = (encode, decode) be the
transformation scheme using hn bits. Let A be any sampling adversary, then
Advdte
DTE,pm(A) ≤
1
2(h−2 log2 3)n
.
Proof. The proof follows Theorem 6 in [61]. We briefly describe it in the following.
P [SAMP1A ⇒ 1]
=
∑
M∈M
P [SAMP1A ⇒ 1|M∗ = M] · pm(M)
≤
∑
M∈M
P [SAMP0A ⇒ 1|M∗ = M] · (pd(M) + 1
2(h−log2 3)n
)
≤ P [SAMP0A ⇒ 1] + 3n · 1
2(h−log2 3)n
= P [SAMP0A ⇒ 1] + 1
2(h−2 log2 3)n
.
(2.16)
This theorem demonstrates that for given any sequence M, it is difficult for an ad-
versary to tell whether it is sampled from pm, or from pd (with negligible advantage
for appropriate h). This is critical because it essentially explains the power of honey
encryption: the adversary is confused whether the decrypted sequence is the original one
(from pm) or a wrong one (from pd). 
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MRB
HE,pm,pk
K∗ ← pk K
M∗ ← pm M
C∗ ← $ HEnc(K∗,M∗)
M← $ B(C∗)
return M = M∗
Figure 2.8: Game defining MR security. Given ciphertext C∗ (encrypted from M∗),
adversary B is allowed to guess the message by brute-force attack. B wins the game if
his output message M is the same as the original message M∗.
The last step of the security analysis is the quantification of message recovery (MR)
security for any adversary B against the encryption scheme HE.
Definition 2.2. Let B be the adversary attempting to recover the correct sequence given
the honey encryption of the sequence, as shown in Figure 2.8. The advantage of B against
HE is
Advmr
HE,pm,pk
(B) = P [MRB
HE,pm,pk
⇒ true].
We emphasize that pk, the password distribution, is non-uniform. We assume the
most probable password has a probability w. Using Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.1, we
can establish the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2. Consider HE[DTE, H] (the detailed definition is available in [61]) with H
(the hash function) modeled as a random oracle and DTE using an hn-bit representation.
Let pm be the sequence distribution with maximum sequence probability γ, and pk be a
key distribution with maximum weight w. Let α = ⌈1/w⌉. Then for any adversary B,
Advmr
HE,pm,pk
(B) ≤ w(1 + δ) + 3
n + α
2(h−log2 3)n
, (2.17)
where δ = α
2
2b
+ eα
4
27b
2 (1− eα2
b
2 )−1 and α = ⌈3/w⌉ and b = ⌊2/γ⌋.
Proof. The proof is similar to Corollary 1 in [61]. We omit the redundant details and
specify the necessary modifications in the following.
pm is a non-uniform sequence distribution and we assume γ ≤ 3−
√
5 ≈ 0.76, which
is a requirement for Corollary 1 (in [61]). This assumption is reasonable considering
the length of the sequence n (≥ 20000)7. To estimate γ, we can consider the sequence
with all major alleles and pessimistically assume each major allele frequency is 0.995,
large enough to give an upper bound for real datasets. Then, γ can be estimated by
0.99520000 ≈ 2.89× 10−44 ≪ 3−√5.
The term 3
n+α
2(h−log2 3)n
is achieved by replacing Advdte
DTE,pm(A) ≤ 12l with our Theorem
1, and |pm(M) − pd(M)| < 12l with our Lemma 1 in the proof of Corollary 1 (in [61]).
Essentially, 3
n+α
2(h−log2 3)n
is the security loss due to DTE imperfectness that causes the
difference between pm and pd.
7We need to focus only on one chromosome because there is no LD between chromosomes. The
number 20000 is based on the observation of chromosome 22 (one of the shortest chromosomes) in a real
dataset from the International HapMap Project.

2.4. SECURITY ANALYSIS 29
Figure 2.10: Experimental security evaluation. We encrypted a genome with a given
password from a pool of 1000 passwords (for simplicity, we assume that the passwords
are integers from 1 to 1000). Each point represents one decryption result using an integer
from the password pool (the x-axis). The y-axis is the logarithm8 of the interval size
of the decrypted sequence when encoded with the recombination model. (a) With a
conventional PBE scheme [64], all the wrong passwords have been ruled out except the
correct one; (b) Obviously, with GenoGuard, no password can be excluded.
under any key yields a valid genome (“valid” does not necessarily mean “plausible”, as
we will show). We show here that for this PBE scheme a very simple classifier suffices
for identifying the correctly decrypted genome with high probability. We encrypted a
victim’s chromosome 22 (see Section 2.6.1 for dataset description and implementation
details) with a given password from a password pool of size 1000 (without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that the passwords are integers from 1 to 1000). We chose “539” as
the correct password for both experiments; and we assumed that the adversary knows
the correct password is a number from the password pool and that he performs a simple
brute-force attack. In real life, brute-force attacks can be carried out if the adversary
knows that the correct password has a limited number of characters (hence memorizable
by users) or even a fixed length (e.g., six-digit PIN code). In the first experiment,
we encrypted the victim’s sequence directly with the PBE scheme in [64] (after encod-
ing by assuming a uniform distribution). In the second experiment, we followed the
same procedure except that we encrypted the victim’s sequence by using the GenoGuard.
Note that in our proposed DTE, the size of the interval of a leaf in the ternary tree is
proportional to the probability of the corresponding sequence. In both experiments, to
rule out wrong passwords, we computed the interval sizes of the decrypted sequences and
observed the result. Figure 2.10 shows the result of the two experiments. We observe
that if the sequence is protected by a direct application of the PBE scheme, the adversary
can exclude most passwords in the attack because the corresponding decrypted sequences
have much lower probabilities than that of the correct sequence. In this example, only
the correct password is retained, as shown in Figure 2.10 (a). With GenoGuard, on the
contrary, the correct sequence is buried among all the decrypted sequences, hence it is
almost impossible to reject any wrong password.
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2.5 Towards Phenotype-Compatible GenoGuard
An individual’s physical traits (such as gender, ancestry and hair color) are highly cor-
related to his DNA sequence. Recently, researchers showed that it is even possible to
model facial traits of an individual from his DNA [73]. Although such progress in human
genetics is desirable for many applications (e.g., forensics), it can pose a threat to our
proposed technique. In particular, such correlations could be used as side information by
an adversary who tries to obtain the sequence of a specific victim (e.g., by trying various
potential passwords). For instance, if the adversary knows that an encrypted sequence
belongs to a victim of Asian ancestry, he might be able to eliminate a (wrong) password
if the genetic sequence obtained using this password does not belong to an individual of
Asian ancestry.
In genetics, gender and ancestry are the most well studied human genetic traits.
These traits have deterministic genotype-phenotype associations, whereas other traits
(such as hair color) have less certain (probabilistic) genotype-phenotype associations.
In this section, we first show that the security of GenoGuard is not affected by traits
with deterministic genotype-phenotype associations. Our main goal is to show that
if an adversary knows a phenotype (physical trait) of a victim, he always retrieves a
decrypted sequence that is consistent with the corresponding phenotype, even if he types
a wrong password. Next, we quantify the privacy loss if an adversary has information
about other traits (with probabilistic genotype-phenotype associations) of a victim via a
privacy analysis.
2.5.1 Traits with Deterministic Genotype-Phenotype Associations
Gender: Gender is determined by sex chromosomes, namely, X chromosome and Y
chromosome. Females have two copies of the X chromosome, whereas males have one X
chromosome and one Y chromosome. Note however that X chromosome and Y chro-
mosome have different lengths. Therefore, the adversary can immediately ascertain
whether a ciphertext comes from an X chromosome or a Y chromosome because the
latter is shorter than the former. As we mentioned in Section 2.3.3, (when implementing
GenoGuard) the whole interval [0, 2hn−1] is determined by the length n of the sequence.
To deal with the gender problem, we use the length of X chromosome for both sex chro-
mosomes. In other words, X chromosome and Y chromosome are encoded in the same
interval [0, 2hn − 1], where n is the length of X chromosome.9 In this way, the adversary
cannot infer any information about the gender because the ciphertext is always of the
same length, whether it belongs to a male sequence or a female sequence. Furthermore,
if the adversary knows the gender of a victim, he will always get a consistent sequence
(based on the gender) when he decodes the ciphertext by using the corresponding public
knowledge of Y (or X) chromosome.
Ancestry: Research has shown that ancestry information can be accurately inferred
from DNA sequences. For example, the sequence of an individual of Asian ancestry usu-
ally has different combinations of SNVs compared to an individual of European origin.
In genetics, ancestry can be inferred with a number of methods, e.g., principal compo-
8Note that hn is close to 80000, hence the interval size is a huge integer and is better expressed as
its logarithm with base 2.
9There is no LD between two different chromosomes, so each chromosome can be encrypted as an
independent sequence.
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nent analysis (PCA) followed by k-means clustering [74]. In this method, a training
set is comprised of a number of individuals, each of which is genotyped on a predefined
set of SNVs (the most informative SNVs). This training set is then fed into PCA in
order to find several principal components. After the dataset is projected on these prin-
cipal components, k-means clustering is applied to cluster the individuals into different
ethnicities.
What we want to achieve in GenoGuard is ethnic plausibility: the principal compo-
nents of the decrypted genome-wide genotyping data should be broadly similar to those
from a real genome. Hence, we argue that the decoding operation with knowledge of re-
combination rates and haploid genotype dataset from a specific population always yields
a sequence belonging to that population. To verify this, we conducted an experimental
analysis depicted in the following.
We used Phase III10 data from the HapMap dataset [70]. In this dataset, we chose 3
populations for our evaluation:
(i). ASW (African ancestry in Southwest USA), with 90 samples;
(ii). CEU (Utah residents with Northern and Western European ancestry from the
CEPH collection), with 165 samples;
(iii). CHB (Han Chinese in Beijing, China), with 90 samples.
We selected 100 SNVs to infer ancestry according to [75]. First, we applied PCA on
the above dataset and selected the first two principal components. The projection of the
dataset on the two principal components can be seen in Figure 2.11(a). We encrypted
a sequence from a specific population (e.g., ASW) by using GenoGuard. Then, for each
of the three aforementioned populations, we decrypted the ciphertext with randomly
guessed passwords 100 times, generating 100 random sequences for each case (in total,
we generated 300 sequences). Finally, we projected these 300 sequences on the principal
components and observed the result, as shown in Figure 2.11(b), (c), and (d). We
conclude that decoding with public knowledge from a population always produces a
sequence of that population, which proves that ancestry inferred from a sequence does
not pose a threat to our proposed technique. We leave the case for people with mixed
blood for the future work, but a reasonable assumption is that corresponding public
knowledge could be available for mixed-blood people in the future.
2.5.2 Traits with Probabilistic Genotype-Phenotype Associations
In theory, the idea we introduce for ancestry also works for other traits: incorporate
phenotype-related data during encoding. For the case of ancestry, such data is provided as
population-specific haploid genotype dataset. However, such data is not easily available
for many other traits (e.g., those with probabilistic genotype-phenotype associations) and
genotype-phenotype associations is ongoing research. In the following, we quantify the
privacy loss when the phenotype of a victim is not taken into account during encoding,
but is exposed to the adversary as side information. For instance, the adversary could
have access to a small number of phenotypical traits by observing a victim’s photographs
from online social networks.
10The third phase of the International HapMap project. This phase increases the number of DNA
samples covered from 270 in phases I and II to 1,301 samples from a variety of human populations.
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Hair Color (T ∗) Prior (PT∗) A
Red
T∗ , A
Blond
T∗ , A
Brown
T∗ , A
Black
T∗
Red 8.8% 60.7%, 28.6%, 7.1%, 3.6%
Blond 42.6% 0.8%, 93.9%, 3.8%, 1.5%
Brown 39.3% 0.8%, 56.7%, 20%, 22.5%
Black 9.3% 0%, 55.2%, 3.4%, 41.4%
Table 2.2: Summary of the results from the HIrisPlex system [78]. The second column,
prior, is the fraction of samples that have the corresponding hair color. The third column
is the vector of prediction accuracies (of the classification algorithm) for all four hair
colors, given that a person has hair color T ∗.
password dataset, the probability of password with rank i is
Pi =Wi
−s, (2.18)
where W and s are constants depending on the dataset. This is actually the password
distribution pk. Suppose the victim’s phenotype is T
∗, which is known to the adversary.
We assume that decryption under a given incorrect password yields phenotype Ti with
probability PTi , and that such assignment is independent across passwords. Whether
an incorrect password is retained then depends on the probability that the decrypted
sequence is classified by the classifier as phenotype T ∗. This event may be modeled
as independent Bernoulli trials across passwords, each with retaining probability Pret
computed as
Pret =
u∑
i=1
PTi ·AT
∗
Ti . (2.19)
Note that for the correct password, the adversary retains it with probability AT
∗
T∗ . From
Theorem 2.2, we observe that the advantage of adversary B without side information is
approximately equal to w, the maximum weight in the password distribution (equivalent
to the above P1). Let B′ represent the adversary with side information T ∗. B′ first
prunes passwords based on the classifier, and then executes the algorithm of adversary B
in the MR game (Figure 2.8) on the resulting smaller password pool consisting of retained
passwords. Let p′k represent this new password distribution, with maximum weight w
′.
We can represent the password pruning procedure as a randomized function f(pk)→ p′k.
Therefore, B′ adheres to the procedure: i) B′ uses f to compute p′k; ii) B′ gives p′k to B.
Let Adv(B′) represent the advantage of adversary B′. We have
Adv(B′) = AT∗T∗ · Ep′k←f(pk)[Adv
mr
HE,pm,p′k
(B)]
≈ AT∗T∗ · Ep′k←f(pk)[w′],
(2.20)
where E is the expectation over the randomized password pruning process, and we ap-
proximate Advmr
HE,pm,p′k
(B) with the maximum weight w′ in the password distribution p′k.
In the following, we quantify Adv(B′) empirically with real data.
For this purpose, we study a recent work about predicting hair color from DNA (the
HIrisPlex system [78]). The study collects DNA samples and hair color information from
1551 European subjects and builds a model to predict the hair color. The results are
shown in Table 2.2.
We use the Zipf’s model in [77], where N = 486118, W = 0.037871 and s = 0.905773.
For different hair colors known by adversary B′, we perform the Bernoulli trials with
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Figure 2.12: Evaluation of adversary’s advantage with the side information of hair color.
Adversary B has no side information, and his advantage is approximately w = 0.0379, the
maximum weight in the original password distribution pk. The advantage of adversary
B′ depends on the prediction accuracy AT∗T∗ and the retaining probability Pret for the
victim’s hair color T ∗.
corresponding Pret on the password pool, and estimate Adv(B′) in Equation (2.20). We
repeat the whole experiment 1000 times for each hair color, and the average results are
shown in Figure 2.12.
With the “Red” hair information, the adversary’s advantage increases from 0.0379 to
0.0642, which is the worst among the four colors (for the victim). This is explained by the
fact that “Red” hair has a very low prior probability that leads to a small Pret, hence most
wrong passwords are deleted. We observe that the empirical estimation of Ep′
k
←f(pk)[w
′]
is consistently larger for a smaller Pret. On the contrary, because “blond” hair has a high
prior probability, a larger number of passwords are retained, hence smaller Ep′
k
←f(pk)[w
′]
and smaller Adv(B′), compared to the case of “Red” hair. From Equation (2.20), the
advantage is also positively correlated to the accuracy of the prediction algorithm. The
low accuracies for “Brown” and “Black” hair (ABrownBrown and A
Black
Black) explain why the
advantage of adversary B′ barely increases, or even decreases11, compared to adversary
B.
Even though side information is a common security concern in cryptography, we
propose a general idea to avoid this problem for GenoGuard: incorporate the side infor-
mation during the encoding phase. Nontrivial as this is, we will elaborate this idea in
our future work, especially for traits with probabilistic genotype-phenotype associations.
2.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the performance, application scenarios, some extensions, and
limitations of the proposed scheme.
11When the prediction is unreliable, it’s better for the adversary to ignore the side information.
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2.6.1 Performance
The time complexity of the encoding phase is O(n) where n is the length of the sequence.
Moreover, the storage overhead of the encrypted seeds is low as shown in Figure 2.9. Note
that the ternary tree does not need to be stored. The encoding and decoding process are
completely executed based on public knowledge; not on a pre-stored tree.
We implemented GenoGuard in Python. It includes mainly four steps: encode, de-
code, PBE encrypt, PBE decrypt. As before, we used the Phase 3 data in International
HapMap Project, for the CEU population [70]. We set the storage overhead parameter
h = 4. As for password-based encryption (decryption), we followed the standard PKCS
#5 [64]. That is, using HMAC-SHA-1 as the underlying pseudorandom function, given
a password P , we first applied a key derivation function
DK = KDF (P, S),
where DK is a 128-bit derived key and S is a 64-bit random salt. DK is used as the key
for an AES block cipher that encrypts the seed in CBC mode. We ran the algorithm on a
cluster of 22 nodes, each with 3.40GHz Intel Xeon CPU E31270 and 64-bit Linux Debian
systems. In other words, the task of encrypting the whole genome was parallelized in
22 nodes that independently encrypt 22 chromosomes. We evaluated GenoGuard on
165 CEU samples, and the average performance is shown in Figure 2.13. Although
encoding (decoding) is more costly than PBE, it is still acceptable considering the size
of a full genome. Moreover, encoding different chromosomes was run in parallel, hence
the running time depends only on the longest chromosome.
2.6.2 Application Scenarios
GenoGuard can be applied to various scenarios, including healthcare and recreational
genomics, for the protection of genomic data. The general protocol in Figure 2.3 can
work in a healthcare scenario without any major changes. In this scenario, a patient
wants a medical unit (e.g., his doctor) to access his genome and perform medical tests.
The medical unit can request for the encrypted seed on behalf of (and with consent
from) the patient. Hence, there is a negotiation phase that provides the password to
the medical unit. Such a phase can be completed automatically via the patient’s smart
card (or smart phone), or the patient can type his password himself. In this setup, the
biobank can be a public centralized database that is semi-trusted. Such a centralized
database would be convenient for the storage and retrieval of the genomes by several
medical units.
For direct-to-customer (DTC) services, the protocol needs some adjustments. For
instance, Counsyl12 and 23andMe13 provide their customers various DTC genetic tests.
In such scenarios, the biobank is the private database of these service providers. Thus,
such service providers have the obligation to protect customers’ genomic data in case of
a data breach. In order to perform various genetic tests, the service providers should
be granted permission to decrypt the sequences on their side, which is a reasonable
relaxation of the threat model because customers share their sequences with the service
providers. Therefore, steps 8 and 9 in Figure 2.3 should be moved to the biobank. A
12https://www.counsyl.com/.
13https://www.23andme.com/.
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Another approach might be to leverage the distinction between recall memory and
recognition memory [79]. The latter is shown to be more robust than the former. For
instance, the system can provide a pool ofN confirmation images, and the user can choose
one before encryption. The confirmation images do not themselves have to be part of the
ciphertext. The system can hash the genome sequence into ZN = {0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1} to
obtain a confirmation index, for security parameter N . The user might confirm correct
decryption simply by indicating that a displayed image is familiar. A similar idea has been
proposed in previous work where the authors apply it to anti-phishing techniques [80].
Another idea is based upon concealment of a biometric template among decoys. For
instance, the user can provide his fingerprint template that is stored with some honey
templates (e.g., synthetic fingerprint images [81], or other users’ templates). These tem-
plates can also be indexed as what we propose for the confirmation images above. During
retrieval, only the user can verify whether the decryption is correct or not using his own
fingerprint.
2.7 Summary
The long-term sensitivity of genomic data gives rise to a need for especially strong pro-
tective mechanisms. Brute-force attacks on standard encryption schemes under strong
passwords should not be considered infeasible in the long term, given the rapid evolution
of computing technology and potential algorithmic advances. In the short term, the use
of low-entropy keys, such as passwords, poses serious risks to password-based encryption
of genomic data.
In this chapter, we describe GenoGuard, a cryptographic system that offers long-
term protection for genomic data against even computationally unbounded adversaries.
Decryption attempts against a GenoGuard ciphertext under an incorrect key yield a
genome sequence that appears statistically plausible even to a sophisticated adversary.
To achieve this guarantee, GenoGuard introduces a novel DTE scheme that efficiently
encodes a genome sequence on a ternary tree with sensitivity to genetic recombination
and mutation, thereby capturing the highly non-uniform probability distribution and
special structure of genomic data. GenoGuard additionally provides security against
adversaries with phenotypic side information (physical traits of victims). We provide a
parallelized software implementation of GenoGuard and demonstrate its efficiency and
scalability on a cluster of nodes. GenoGuard thus offers an appealing approach to the
increasingly important challenge of protection of genomic data.

Chapter 3
Searching-enabled genomic data
protection
In the previous chapter, we discussed the importance of securing genomic data stor-
age, and presented a solution that is robust even under brute-force attacks against weak
passwords. With either standard symmetric encryption or the presented GenoGuard, it
is sufficient for scenarios where secure storage is the sole requirement and users always
decrypt the whole data before usage (or decrypt data blocks if data is segmented into
blocks which are encrypted separately with salted keys or with different nonces). In
some use cases that we will describe later, efficient database searching is a necessary
feature, but none of the aforementioned encryption options enable searching under se-
mantic security. Moreover, in many genomic applications, searching is based on ranges,
instead of keywords, which poses another design challenge for the reconciliation of se-
curity, functionality, and efficiency. In these applications, semantic security might be
hard to achieve if one wants to satisfy all functionality and efficiency requirements and
impose minimal changes to existing practices (which normally work with NO encryption
at all). For example, to enable searching, one of the most secure and relatively efficient
cryptography-based solution is searchable encryption [94]; nevertheless, it only works for
keyword searching and leaks non-trivial information in searching results, and will bring
excessive changes to current practices because big genomic data are stored in specific
formats that are not necessarily compatible with searchable encryption schemes. In or-
der to advocate a smooth transition from current insecure practices to the secure use of
genomic data, in this chapter, we describe a privacy-preserving solution based on order-
preserving encryption that provides relatively weaker notion of security than searchable
encryption, but nonetheless is efficient and fully compatible with current practices.
While the generation of genome sequence data is no longer cost-prohibitive, the un-
precedented rate of data production presents new challenges for data storage and man-
agement. For example, the 1000 Genomes Project Consortium generated more data in
its first 6 months than the NCBI GenBank database had accumulated in its 21 years
of existence [95]. Sequence data are being more routinely used for diagnostic purposes,
which has raised concerns regarding security and privacy. Until recently, it was standard
in clinical genetics to screen only one or two genes for mutations relevant to a spe-
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cific disease, but high-throughput sequencing technologies have now made whole-genome
or whole-exome sequence data commonplace. These comprehensive sequence data sets
must then be securely stored and relevant variants made available to various stakehold-
ers in the healthcare system. Preventing incidental leakage of personal data requires
not only encryption but also defining access privileges and enabling selective retrieval.
Although some encryption solutions (e.g., in cramtools [96]) have been proposed, they
remain straight-forward applications of encryption standards and do not take into con-
sideration the aforementioned threat model. Addressing these issues of security and
privacy while minimizing storage costs will be essential for the large-scale application of
personal genomics in research and clinical settings. Here, we describe a solution that
minimizes information leakage, stores the sequence data in a lossless compressed format,
and optimizes the performance of downstream analysis (e.g., variant calling).
Since 2007, when the first high-throughput sequencing technology was released to the
market, the growth rate of genomic data has outpaced Moore’s law, more than doubling
each year [97]. Big data researchers estimate the current worldwide sequencing capacity
to exceed 35 petabases per year [98]. For every 3 billion bases of human genome sequence,
30-fold more data (about 100 gigabases) must be collected to ensure sufficient coverage
at each nucleotide. More than 100 petabytes of storage are already used by the worlds
largest 20 biological research institutions; this corresponds to more than $1 million USD
in storage maintenance costs if we consider Amazon cloud storage pricing [99]. This
number continues to grow, and it is estimated that 2 - 40 exabytes of storage capacity
will be needed by 2025 to store hundreds of thousands of human genomes. To face this
challenge, more efficient approaches to genomic data storage are needed.
Current approaches for genomic data storage use different methods for compres-
sion [100]. Before high-throughput technologies were introduced, algorithms were de-
signed for compressing genomic sequences of relatively small size (e.g., tens of megabases).
These algorithms, such as BioCompress [101], GenCompress [102], and DNACom-
press [103], exploit the redundancy within DNA sequences and compress the data by
identifying highly repetitive subsequences. The latest sequencing technologies pose new
challenges for the compression of genomic data in terms of data size and structure. Due
to the high similarity of DNA sequences among individuals, it is inefficient to store and
transfer a newly assembled genomic sequence in its entirety, because> 99% of the data for
two assembled human genomes are the same. This has led to the approach of storing only
differences from a reference sequence (known as reference-based compression), such as the
DNAzip algorithm [104]. Apart from entire assembled sequences, individuals sequence
data are typically organized as millions of short reads of 100 to 400 bases, as produced
by state-of-the-art sequencing technologies. Each genomic position is usually covered by
multiple short reads. General-purpose compression algorithms, such as gzip [105], are
applicable to these data sets. For example, the BAM format [106], which remains the de
facto standard for storing aligned short reads, is already highly compressed by applying
gzip compression to the data blocks.
Various advanced compression algorithms have been proposed for high-throughput
DNA sequence data (Quip [107], Samcomp [108], HUGO [109], etc.). Among larger
data sets (e.g., The 1000 Genomes Project Consortium), there is an observable trend
toward using the highly compressed format CRAM [110], a reference-based compression
algorithm for aligned data. Most advanced algorithms also use variable-length encod-
ing (VLC) techniques, such as Huffman encoding and Golomb encoding, to compress
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the metadata (read name, position, mapping quality, etc.). Recently, researchers devel-
oped a cloud-computing framework called ADAM [111], which uses various engineering
techniques (e.g., dictionary coding, gzip compression, distributed processing) to reduce
storage costs by 25% compared with BAM. This scheme achieves significant (2×-10×)
acceleration in genomic data access patterns. A group of MIT researchers released a
lossy compression algorithm called Quartz [112], which can discard 95% of quality scores
without compromising the accuracy of downstream analysis. Their method works on the
FASTQ file stage and can be plugged in as a preprocessing step for the aforementioned
methods (and our solution) to achieve a higher compression ratio. Our solution is a
lossless compression method that enables the user to completely reconstruct the original
data (BAM files). To our knowledge, there is no existing compression solution that pro-
vides strong security and privacy control, the issue we address in this chapter. There is
thus a need to integrate encryption methods into compression solutions for genomic data
that are secure and privacy-preserving [100]. The closest example of such a solution [115]
provides a privacy-preserving solution for storing BAM files, but it does not provide an
efficient method for compression.
For clinical or research purposes, the most valuable information from human genomic
data is the set of genetic variants that are identified across the genome. Typically,
sequence data are taken as input for a pipeline and retrieved for downstream analyses, for
example, variant calling. Given this usage scenario, it is crucial to have a storage format
that is amenable to efficient downstream analyses. For example, it is common practice to
aggregate information on a position from all short reads that cover the position (pile-up);
hence, it is desirable that the storage format organizes information in this manner. In
addition, it is challenging to enable selective retrieval of encrypted data because global
encryption solutions obfuscate index information. As we demonstrate in this chapter,
our SECRAM solution is convenient not only for retrieval but also for protection in that
it enables the retrieval of specific information about the genome without compromising
the rest of it.
In this chapter, we present our genomic data storage solution to address the challenges
of compression, security, and retrieval. SECRAM is a novel aligned data storage format
that is (1) organized in position-based storage that enables random queries anywhere in
the genome, (2) highly compressed through a combination of reference-based and general
data compression techniques, and (3) encrypted with standard secure cryptographic tech-
niques and a fine-grained privacy control mechanism. By applying our solution, sequence
data are securely protected in storage and can be efficiently retrieved for downstream
analysis (e.g., variant calling) without any access to unauthorized information. Below,
we compare SECRAM with two state-of-the-art storage solutions, BAM and CRAM,
which are two of the most widespread formats for aligned sequence data. Our major goal
is to bridge the gap between compression and protection of genomic data.
3.1 Background
The DNA sequence data produced by DNA sequencing consists of millions of short reads,
each typically including between 100 and 400 nucleotides (A,C,G,T), depending on the
type of sequencer. These reads are randomly sampled from a human genome. Each read
is then treated and positioned (aligned) to its genetic location to produce a so-called
SAM file (Sequence Alignment Map). BAM file (Binary Alignment Map) is simply the
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The third step will be explained in the next two sections with detailed encryption and
masking techniques. For the sake of brevity, we mention the security and privacy goals
we intend to achieve in the system:
• The original content of a short read cannot be accessed without explicit permission
from the owner;
• Users (e.g., medical units) can access only restricted regions of data that are au-
thorized by the owner; each user is allowed to access only specific region(s), e.g., a
medical unit that specializes in female breast and ovarian cancers might be allowed
to access only BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes;
• In order to prevent the inference attack on the purpose of user access, the storage
center (i.e., the Biobank) should not learn about the region that a user accesses.
3.3 SECRAM Format
The SECRAM format conversion framework is depicted in Figure 3.2, including trans-
position from read-based storage (BAM) to position-based storage, compression, encryp-
tion, and retrieval (e.g., for variant calling). Following sequence alignment to a reference
genome, the data are transposed, compressed, and encrypted. All these steps are one-
time operations for each individual file. Afterwards, the SECRAM format can be queried
routinely for data retrieval. More details of SECRAM are specified in the following sub
sections.
3.3.1 Transposition
Aligned genomic sequence data are typically stored by sequencing reads (e.g., BAM,
CRAM formats) (Figure 3.2-A). The first step of our solution is to organize the data by
position instead of by read (Figure 3.2-B). This is crucial because (1) it facilitates multiple
downstream analysis procedures, notably the variant calling pipeline, and (2) it allows us
to seamlessly combine compression and encryption (fine-grained privacy control). The
conversion between the two formats is equivalent to a matrix transposition, when we
consider the index of the reads as one dimension and the position of the reference genome
as the other dimension. If necessary, our format can be inversely transposed to BAM
without losing information; this functionality makes our format compatible with several
other applications designed for a read-based format, such as visually displaying reads
that overlap with a specific genomic region.
Figure 3.3 describes the detailed structure of SECRAM in the manner of regular
expressions. We denote the important notations as follows:
• ‘ˆ’ is the start marker of a read
• ‘$’ is the end marker of a read
• ‘.*’ denotes the base information at this position.
• ‘[Read Info]’ contains information about this read, such as read name (or id), strand,
mapping quality, etc.
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that one read could have different orders for different positions because the corresponding
lists of covered reads in those positions vary. For example, in Figure 3.3, on Position
+3, “Read3” has order 3 because it is the third covering read, but on Position +4, it
has order 1 because “Read1” and “Read2” end in the last position and “Read3” now
becomes the first covering read. Given a position, a PosCigar is composed of mainly
three possibilities:
(i). Order||′S′||[A|T |C|G] : the read (specified by Order) has a substitution with the
specified letter compared to the reference.
(ii). Order||′I ′||i||{A, T,C,G}i : the read has an insertion of i letters that are listed.
(iii). Order||′D′ : the read has a deletion.
For example, a PosCigar that looks like “9I4ATTG...23SA...57D”, means:
• 9I4ATTG: an insertion of 4 letters “ATTG” in the 9th read
• 23SA: a substitution with letter ‘A’ in the 23rd read
• 57D: a deletion in the 57th read
More operators (e.g., soft clipping, hard clipping, skipping region [106]) are also encoded
in SECRAM, and we omit the redundant details here because each of them is handled
similarly as one of the three aforementioned operators. As one possible design option,
each position row can be encoded as:
Row size||Position||List of read headers||quality scores||PosCigar
In the following, we explain the terminology used in this option.
• Row size: Length (measured in bytes) of a position row;
• List of read headers: List of information of the reads that start at this position.
It is decomposed as “(Order||Read Info)∗” , with ‘*’ meaning an arbitrary number
of such headers. The read information would also include read length so that we
do not have to store the end marker as in Figure 3.3.
• Quality scores: Quality scores for the bases of this position.
• PosCigar: The variants information.
3.3.3 Encryption
SECRAM protects genomic data using secure symmetric encryption (SE) techniques. To
provide fine-grained privacy control and avoid information leakage in data retrieval, our
solution encrypts the variant information for each position independently. We encrypt
positions with order-preserving encryption (OPE) [120] to enable efficient retrieval of
encrypted data without decryption. This is a critical feature to prevent insider attacks
on servers that store the encrypted data. We encrypt other sensitive information (e.g.,
short read differences relative to the reference) using conventional SE (e.g., AES). Figure
3.4 summarizes the format encryption design. Notably, encryption adds randomness to
the data, which inevitably affects the compression ratio. We explain the basics of these
two encryption schemes below.
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Metadata
The SECRAM format contains all necessary information to enable reconstruction of the
original BAM files. This is achieved with the metadata field at each position. This field
is not encrypted and contains two categories of information: (1) quality scores and (2)
information about reads that begin at that position. The first category is a numerical
score (the phred-scaled base error probability: −10 log10 Pr{base is wrong}), while the
second has a slightly more complicated structure. For each read that begins at position
P , the metadata for P will store the following information: read name, read length,
mapping quality, and pair information.
3.3.4 Indexing
The indexing of aligned genomic data is a map from positions to file offsets such that,
given queried positions, a data reader can randomly access the file. Indexing is easy to
implement in SECRAM. Our index file contains a list of tuples of position and file offset,
where position is the genomic position of the first position row in a gzip block, and file
offset is the byte offset of a gzip block in the compressed file. Hence, when we retrieve
data for a position, a binary search first locates the gzip block containing the position,
and then a linear search locates the position in the block.
3.4 System Implementation
In this section, we provide details about the encryption schemes, key management, and
protocols for secure and fast retrieval.
3.4.1 Encryption
All fields, except “Position” and “PosCigar”, are left in clear, because they do not contain
any highly sensitive information. The encryption scheme can be described as follows:
• The patient (data owner) is assigned with a master key Km that is used to derive
various encryption keys.
• The position field is encrypted with order-preserving encryption (OPE) [120] for
the efficiency of a random access based on position comparison (details in Section
3.3.3). A key, Kope, is derived from Km and used for OPE.
• The PosCigar field is encrypted with a stream cipher (SC). A key, Ksc, is derived
from Km and used for the SC. For the i-th GZIP block in the file, the PosCigar
fields of all the included position rows are concatenated to generate a single data
block, Di, which is encrypted with Ksc and a 64-bit random salt Ri. The random
salts are stored in the index file.
The above keys are stored at the MK.
3.4.2 Basic Retrieval
The retrieval process consists of the following steps:
(i). MU and MK setup a one-time symmetric session key Kss;
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(ii). MU encrypts the range [P1, P2] with AES under the key Kss , to generate the
ciphertext [AES(Kss, P1),AES(Kss, P2)] that is sent to MK (or first sent to Biobank
which forwards it to MK);
(iii). MK decrypts [AES(Kss, P1),AES(Kss, P2)] and re-encrypts it with OPE under the
key Kope, generating ciphertext [OPE(Kope, P1),OPE(Kope, P2)] that is sent to the
Biobank;
(iv). The Biobank retrieves the k GZIP blocks (Bi, Bi+1, · · · , Bi+k−1) that overlap with
the range [OPE(Kope, P1),OPE(Kope, P2)], with the help of the index file. The
Biobank decompresses the block Bi, and computes an offset value of the position
row OPE(Kope, P1), denoted by OFFP1 : the byte offset of its PosCigar field in the
data block Di (Di was defined in Section 3.4.1). OFFP2 is computed similarly. The
Biobank sends OFFP1 , OFFP2 , and random salts (Ri, Ri+1, · · · , Ri+k−1) to MK;
(v). With key Ksc, MK derives the corresponding decryption keys
(DKi, DKi+1, · · · , DKi+k−1) for the k blocks, masking those rows
out of the range [P1, P2]. MK encrypts these keys, thus generating
(AES(Kss, DKi),AES(Kss, DKi+1), · · · ,AES(Kss, DKi+k−1)), and it sends
these encrypted keys to the Biobank;
(vi). The Biobank sends the k GZIP blocks (Bi, Bi+1, · · · , Bi+k−1) and the encrypted
keys (AES(Kss, DKi),AES(Kss, DKi+1), · · · ,AES(Kss, DKi+k−1)) to MU;
(vii). MU decompresses the blocks and decrypts the content.
3.4.3 Context-Aware Retrieval
In the basic retrieval scheme, we do not address the problem that the returned data might
contain incomplete reads and thus cannot perform queries of read information, such as
mapping quality, strand, and a relative position inside a read. Because the metadata
(read name, mapping quality, read flags, etc.) are stored only at the starting position of
a read, Biobank needs to retrieve the complete context of a position row. One solution
is to return the “Read Info” of the position row.
Consider the query range [P1, P2]. If the position row P1 contains any read that is
not complete in block Bi (specifically, it does not start at this block), the storage server
traces back to the previous block(s) and crops the corresponding metadata fields for the
incomplete reads of row P1. As a block normally contains thousands of positions, the
server usually needs to look back to at most one previous block, as long as the reads are
not excessively long (e.g., in our experiments, we use a block size of 50,000 positions).
The server then returns these metadata fields along with the complete sequence data
(only) within the query range.
3.4.4 Efficient Query Processing
We discuss how to efficiently answer the queries that are interesting to MU. Before going
into details, we state the following assumption:
• The genomic positions are queried sequentially. In other words, if the position rows
in a genomic range [P1, P2] are returned, these rows are queried from P1 to P2 one
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by one. This assumption does not affect the correctness of our system, rather it
affects the efficiency.
The queries related to one position are more efficient than those related to a complete
read. Examples of queries of one position include the coverage of a position, the variants
(substitution, insertion and deletion) and quality scores. The complexity of answering
these queries is O(C), where C is the coverage of this position. The overall complexity
of iterating all positions in the range [P1, P2] is O((P2 − P1)C).
For queries related to a complete read, we need to access the “Read Info” field. But
this field does not exist in each row. The main idea is that we run the reconstruction
algorithm for a position row whenever these queries are needed. Then the complexity
of answering these queries for all rows in the range [P1, P2] is O((P2 − P1)CL), where
L is length of a read and C is the coverage. But with the above assumption, we can
carry out the task much more efficiently. In the context-aware retrieval, the Biobank
needs to run the reconstruction algorithm for the position P1. In the data returned to
MU, “Read Info” fields already exist for all the reads of position P1. To answer queries
from position P1 to P2, MU maintains a cache that contains the “Read Info” fields of
all reads in the current position. The cache is initialized to the “Read Info” fields of
position P1, and is updated as MU move to the next position. The complexity of this
method is O(CL + (P2 − P1)C), if the one-time reconstruction in the Biobank is taken
into account.
3.4.5 Software Details
For processing BAM files and applying VLC and block compression techniques, SECRAM
uses the open-source Java library, HTSJDK [122], designed for high-throughput sequenc-
ing data. For encryption, SECRAM builds its security solution based on the open-source
Java library, Bouncy Castle [123]. Depending on the category of information, SECRAM
chooses appropriate compression methods to achieve high compression ratio (Table 3.1).
SECRAM is open source at https://github.com/acs6610987/secram.
3.5 Evaluation and Analysis
3.5.1 Storage Analysis
In Figure 3.6, we show the compression performance of SECRAM compared with BAM
and CRAM for both paired and unpaired simulated data sets of different coverages1
and error rates (substitution, insertion, and deletion). Both the SECRAM and CRAM
formats preserve all information from BAM files, including quality scores, read names,
and read-pair information. The number of bits per base is calculated by dividing the
size of the file by the total number of bases (roughly equal to reference length multiplied
by the coverage). Unsurprisingly, for all three formats, the average per-base storage cost
decreases as the coverage increases. In contrast to CRAM, SECRAM does not compress
efficiently when the coverage is very low (e.g., 1×) because of the storage overhead of
encryption. Yet as coverage increases (e.g., 10×), the benefit of compression becomes
more pronounced, mitigating the storage costs of encryption. In the best case, for high-
coverage unpaired data with a 0.01% error rate, SECRAM and CRAM have almost
1Coverage is the number of reads that include a given nucleotide in the data file.
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Information type Compression/encryption method
Position Step 1: Order-preserving encryption
Step 2: Gzip block compression
Read bases Step 1: Reference-based compression
and VLC compression
Step 2: AES encryption in CRT mode
Quality scores Gzip block compression (optional lossy
compression)
Read name Gzip block compression
Mapping quality VLC compression
Template length Gzip block compression
Flag (e.g., strand) VLC compression
Auxiliary text (e.g., tags in
BAM)
Gzip block compression
Table 3.1: Compression and encryption methods for different types of information in
SECRAM. Only positions and read bases are encrypted, with OPE and SE, respectively.
Note that positions are encrypted with OPE before block compression in order to enable
indexing. Block compression is chosen for the information that has a wide variety of
values, or for text information, or merely as a default way to save storage. AES encryption
in CTR mode stands for advanced encryption standard in counter mode, which is one
way of applying a block cipher in a stream-cipher mode (essentially equivalent to a stream
cipher).
identical compression ratios, both using nearly 4 bits/base. We also observed that, in
general, compression ratios are lower for paired data with higher error rates because there
is more information (e.g., metadata and variants) in the data. Compared with BAM,
SECRAM saves 18% of storage on average when the coverage is higher than 10×; this is
slightly lower than CRAM, which saves 34% of storage but has no privacy and security
features. Figure 3.6-B shows the average storage costs on several randomly selected
real data files from the 1000 Genomes Project repository (The 1000 Genomes Project
Consortium 2015) with an average coverage of 3×. We observed a similar compression
ratio as with simulated data in Figure 3.6-A.
3.5.2 Runtime Analysis
To assess the runtime efficiency of SECRAM, we considered the performance of its six
most important subprocedures: transposition, inverse transposition, compression, decom-
pression, encryption, and decryption. We ran experiments on simulated data sets with a
range of coverages and error rates. Figure 3.7-A shows the runtime breakdowns in per-
centages for different subprocedures relative to total runtime, across four experiments.
One important observation is that encryption and decryption are not bottlenecks in the
system, demonstrating that our implementation of security does not come at the cost of
efficiency. When coverage and error rate are low, compression is slower than encryption
and dominates the runtime; this is because there is less information to encrypt, but it
still takes time to compress the nonsensitive information. When the error rate is higher,
the encryption time surpasses compression time, mainly because of order-preserving en-
cryption (OPE) on more positions, but the global runtime does not change much even
for a high error rate (1%). The high coverage hinders (inverse) transposition more than
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BAM file of 100 gigabytes can be converted to SECRAM in parallel with 24 threads (one
thread for each reference chromosome: 22 autosomes plus two sex chromosomes) in ∼ 1h.
So far, we have analyzed the runtime costs of converting a whole BAM file or a
whole SECRAM file, which is a one-time cost. For most applications, conversion is not
necessary, but selective retrieval is crucial for efficiency. We designed this new format so
that laboratories need only to store the inherently encrypted, compressed SECRAM files
and develop analysis pipelines for accessing the data directly from these files. Therefore,
it is critical to evaluate the efficiency of the SECRAM format for data retrieval. Figure
3.7-C shows the average runtime performance of random access of a data region of one
megabase (the cost scales linearly with the size of the region). The total time for the
retrieval procedure is < 0.5 seconds, which is efficient for real-time usage in any analysis
pipeline. In traditional use, without any security measures, data retrieval consists of at
least three steps (random access, disk reading, and decompression); decryption roughly
doubles the runtime overhead, which we believe to be acceptable, given the strong privacy
and security features.
3.5.3 Security and Privacy Analysis
Two encryption schemes are used in SECRAM. The symmetric encryption (SE) scheme
used in SECRAM provides semantic security that is a standard and strong security
guarantee in cryptography. OPE is less secure than SE (see Section 3.6). In SECRAM
format, information is organized by genomic position. Therefore, during retrieval, the
storage server can search the encrypted data (due to the properties of OPE) to locate the
exact range of data in the query. The stream cipher mode enables the server to restrict
the decryption key stream to only the information within the query range; hence, private
information about other positions is protected from clients who send the query. This is
in contrast to applying straightforward encryption techniques to read-based data, which
risks information leakage from overlapping reads with each retrieval. Therefore, the
position-based storage used in SECRAM is crucial for its fine-tuned data protection and
privacy control.
3.5.4 Real Case Study
We envision SECRAM as most useful when deployed for routine clinical care. There are
two phases that typically comprise the clinical application of genomic data: (1) variant
calling: a hospital outsources a large volume of sequence data to the cloud and delegates
variant annotation to a specialized bioinformatics company (e.g., Sophia Genetics [124]);
and (2) mutation querying: a clinician in the hospital queries for hotspot mutations
for precise diagnosis of a patient. In the first phase, the hospital should restrict the
company’s access to a predefined set of genes for variant calling in order to respect
patient privacy, whereas in the second phase, a clinician should only access the genes
that are related to their area of specialty. Both phases require the property of selective
retrieval on encrypted sequence data on the cloud, ideally without having the hospital
frequently handle access control on data requests. Typically, the data corresponding to
a gene (or a set of genes) are accessed twice, necessarily in the first phase of variant
calling and potentially in the second phase of mutation querying if the clinician requires
verification of raw sequence data.


3.6. DISCUSSION 57
storage formats, preventing the data leakage to which read-based formats are susceptible,
without slowing down data retrieval or analysis. We provide algorithms for conversion
to and from BAM/read-based formats, compression, decompression, encryption, and
decryption.
3.6.1 Attacks Against OPE
As described below, the ciphertext of OPE contains both order and equality informa-
tion about the underlying data. Therefore, if it is assumed that an attacker has enough
information, OPE-encrypted data are vulnerable to some well-known attacks that ex-
ploit this property, such as frequency analysis attacks [120, 125, 126]. However, these
frequency-analysis attacks would not be effective against our scheme, because (1) posi-
tions are encrypted only once regardless of the coverage, because all information about
each position is clustered together in the transposition phase of SECRAM; (2) we use
different OPE keys for data from different individuals; and (3) the underlying message
in our adopted OPE scheme is usually a subset of the whole position space of genomic
data, and it matches the requirement of the OPE scheme for message unpredictability.
Regarding the third reason, however, the level of data protection depends on the data,
more specifically, on the distribution of genetic variants and sequencing errors across
the genome. If average coverage and sequencing error rate are high enough such that
there is at least one different base from the reference genome on almost every position,
SECRAM protection with OPE will be less effective. In this case, OPE would have to
encrypt the whole plaintext space and thus provide little protection. The compromise of
position information also leads to potential threats for the content encrypted by SE. For
example, if positions are known and coverage can be inferred from the encrypted content
size, CNV (copy number variation) analysis can identify deletions/insertions without the
need for the sequence itself, and other single-nucleotide variants can be inferred by ob-
serving peaks of encrypted information size on the compromised positions. Nevertheless,
a countermeasure would be to shuﬄe the OPE ciphertext [115], which is essentially a
second-level encryption and reduces the efficiency of retrieval. An alternative counter-
measure is to add random padding to each position to obfuscate the size of encrypted
content at the cost of storage efficiency.
The purpose of adopting OPE as a building block is to maximize the difficulty of
launching a successful attack against the encryption scheme while still allowing for ef-
ficient retrieval from the ciphertext. To enable efficient retrieval, the order information
must be observable from the ciphertext, and under this premise, OPE is the optimal avail-
able solution with the best security guarantee, as the database community has recognized
long ago [127]. We do not rule out the possibility that there could be other variants of
frequency-analysis attacks against the OPE scheme adopted in this work; however, there
already exist several enhanced OPE schemes [128, 129, 130] as potential replacements of
the current version. Another alternative to OPE would be secure multiparty computa-
tion (SMC), for example, SMC schemes based on homomorphic encryption. Considering
the high volume of data in the problem addressed here, however, SMC would introduce
a prohibitively high overhead to storage and retrieval.
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3.6.2 Lossy Compression
In the open-source implementation of CRAM [96], multiple lossy compression options
are provided, such as removing read names and reducing the precision of quality scores.
These options are also made available in our solution. For instance, we noticed that
quality scores account for most of the storage space. We provide a parameter to specify
the precision of quality scores; the default option maintains the original scores to allow
exact reconstruction of the BAM file. A compression algorithm called Quartz [112] can
be used to discard 95% of quality scores without affecting the accuracy of downstream
analysis. Although their solution requires further validation, it indicates that lossy com-
pression is a possibility for reducing storage requirements without jeopardizing the value
of the data.
3.6.3 Datatype Applicability
SECRAM is designed to be compatible with SAM/BAM files; hence it enables, or is
extensible to, a variety of sequence data that can be handled by SAM/BAM. These
include (but are not limited to) the following:
• Multiple mapping. A read can be mapped to multiple alignments, for example, due
to repetition. One of these alignments is considered primary, whereas the other
alignments are annotated as secondary and have a link to the primary alignment.
In BAM files, the read bases and quality scores of secondary alignments are set
to “empty” to reduce the file size. SECRAM can be extended similarly to nullify
bases and quality scores of the corresponding positions of secondary alignments and
to include a link to the primary alignment in the read headers of these secondary
alignments.
• Long reads. Several high-throughput sequencing systems produce long reads (e.g.,
the Sequel system [131], with read length 10 - 15 kb), for which SECRAMs preven-
tion of read-based information leakage is even more valuable. Similar to CRAM,
SECRAM is expected to have a slightly higher compression ratio with longer reads,
assuming the same coverage depth, because there is less read information (e.g.,
read name). However, this improvement is modest because the majority of storage
(> 80% in our data) is occupied by read bases and quality scores.
• RNA-seq data. RNA sequence data are stored in the same way as DNA sequence
data in BAM formats and hence can be processed in essentially the same manner
by SECRAM.
3.7 Summary
Overall, our solution addresses the pressing issues of data storage and security brought
about by advances in sequencing technology and the emergence of personal and clini-
cal genomics. By bridging the persistent gap between compression and security in the
storage of genomic data, SECRAM offers an effective balance between the needs of re-
searchers for efficient data analysis and the needs of individuals to maintain their genetic
privacy. It will be important to continuously reevaluate the standards of genomic data
storage as novel technologies are developed, security threats arise, and more complex
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phenotypic analyses become possible. Integrative solutions that carefully consider the
use and misuse of personal genomic data are essential for ensuring its secure, effective
storage and maximizing its utility in treating and preventing disease.

Chapter 4
Protecting genomic data with
arithmetic-computation capability
Apart from searching on protected genomic data, more sophisticated operations are re-
quired in many important use cases. For instance, researchers may want to issue statis-
tical queries on encrypted genomic database, or doctors may want to compute disease
risks by incorporating genomic information. There are various tools for executing sophis-
ticated computation on protected genomic data, but each comes with certain drawbacks:
• homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation: High runtime over-
head, communication cost, and storage blowup;
• differential privacy : Accuracy degradation;
• trusted computing (e.g., Intel SGX): Questionable trust model.
As we mentioned, the searching functionality in the previous chapter could also be imple-
mented with homomorphic encryption or secure multiparty computation, but it would be
impractical, considering the huge amount of data. In this chapter, in order to perform
arithmetic computation, we introduce a system based on secure multiparty computa-
tion, by focusing on an important use case, namely, data quality control in genomic
applications.
Large human genomic databases enable researchers to conduct whole genome anal-
ysis on genomic variations and their associations with phenotypic traits. For instance,
in a case-control Genome-Wide Association Study (GWAS) scenario, researchers can
compute χ2-statistics to reveal whether some genetic variants and a given disease are
independent or not up to a significance level. In another case, researchers might use
linear regression for modeling the relationship between a continuous phenotypic trait
(dependent variable) and a genetic variant (explanatory variable). Although small-scale
GWAS can identify variants associated with diseases, these variants explain only a small
portion of the risk variability for many diseases. Discovery of new significant associa-
tions requires much larger sample sizes. However, the privacy-sensitive nature of human
genomic data prevents research groups from sharing genomic data of individual partic-
ipants, especially when it comes to cross-border collaboration. Therefore, it is usually
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hard or even impossible to directly combine data from several groups to enlarge sample
sizes. Nevertheless, to increase statistical power and reduce false-positive findings, re-
searchers can use Genome-Wide Association Meta-Analysis (GWAMA) for the synthesis
of results from multiple independent studies, thanks to the fact that GWAMA requires
only aggregate statistics rather than individual genomic data from each study.
Generally speaking, GWAMA can be divided into two phases: the data-quality-
control phase and the meta-analysis phase. Quality control (QC) usually takes place
before meta-analysis, in order to filter out the studies whose data have quality issues and
thus are not appropriate for meta-analysis. Both phases involve multiple processing steps
of summary data from individual studies. Quality control is an important procedure for
ensuring the quality or even the correctness of a meta-analysis.
Our proposed system is built upon a comprehensive protocol describing the state-of-
the-art procedure to conduct data QC for large-scale GWAMA [132]. This particular
framework has incorporated all the necessary QC steps proven to be helpful in practice.
In this framework, each study shares its own association statistics for each genetic variant,
such as allele frequencies, P-value and effect size estimates with standard errors, which
are delivered to the analysts. The analysts will apply statistical techniques to detect
potential errors in the aggregate data. For example, quality control will check whether
the same allele is designated as the effect allele for all studies, in order to prevent that
one study erroneously declares the other allele as the effect one. These quality issues
could lead to unexpected or incorrect conclusions for the variant associations if the data
were used blindly. We should emphasize that the quality control procedure is designed
to detect systematic errors of a study, hence if such an error exists, many data points
(i.e. statistics of single nucleotide variants (SNVs)) will deviate significantly from the
expected ones, and thus this phenomenon can be easily observed by plotting the data.
However, even aggregate statistics may contain sensitive information from each par-
ticipant; it has been demonstrated that individual information (e.g., cohort membership)
can still be inferred from the published summary data [11, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 12]. As
a matter of fact, the practice of publishing certain aggregate data has been discouraged
since the revelation of the privacy breach of public summary statistics. For instance,
the NIH1 removed aggregate genomic data (e.g. allele frequencies and P-values) from
open-access databases, and urged the scientific community to take precautions before
sharing any aggregate GWAS data [138]. These statistical inference attacks are based on
a similar idea: if an adversary has access to a large number of SNVs (both the victims
SNVs and the aggregate results of the SNVs), it can gain strong enough statistical power
to tell whether the victim is a contributor to the dataset. If a dataset contains sensitive
health information about participants such as their HIV status, such an inference is a
serious privacy breach.
The privacy issue of sharing plaintext aggregate statistics resides in that they reveal
aggregate statistics for a high number of SNVs (we call these SNV-level statistics, for-
mally defined in Section 4.1.1), and these statistics are exactly the input to a quality
control procedure and a meta-analysis model. A secure approach is needed in order to
complete the procedure without revealing the SNV-level statistics of any single study. A
secure protocol for the meta-analysis phase has been proposed by operating on encrypted
study statistics such that only the result of the meta-analysis is revealed [29]. However,
as we shall see, quality control is a fundamentally more complicated procedure, and
1National Institutes of Health in United States
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protecting this phase remains an open problem. In the proposed secure quality control
(SQC), it guarantees that the analysts will receive nothing other than the final quality
measurements. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive solution for
secure quality control for meta-analysis of genome-wide association studies.
4.1 Background
4.1.1 SNV-Level Aggregate Statistics in Quality Control
A meta-analysis protocol usually requires the aggregate association statistics such as
effect allele frequency (EAF) (f), beta estimate2 (β), standard error (e) and P-value (p),
for a predefined set of variants. We denote the set of SNV-level statistics for study j as
{(f, β, e, p)i,j}, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, where n is the number of variants. We use these four
types of statistics for demonstrating our solution in a secure quality control pipeline, but
it is easy to extend the solution to handle other types of statistics. We also use Nj to
denote the sample size (number of participants) of study j, and Nj is usually a public
value.
4.1.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation
A well-established cryptographic approach called secure multi-party computation (SMC)
guarantees the following property (without loss of generality, we use two parties through-
out the chapter):
Definition 4.1 (Secure two-party computation). Suppose there are two parties, Alice and
Bob, who have their own private data x and y, respectively, and want to securely compute
a function F (x, y).The SMC technique enables Alice and Bob to execute a protocol that
outputs the result R = F (x, y), without Alice learning any other information on Bob’s
input y, nor Bob learning any other information on Alice’s input x.
Using this technique in the quality-control scenario, we can imagine splitting each
statistics into two random and individually uninformative shares (secret shares), one
stored by Alice and one stored by Bob. The quality control can then define a set of
functions to be securely computed on the two shares. The underlying statistics are not
revealed as long as Alice and Bob do not collude, which is realistic in practice if, for
example, the two parties are chosen to be private, competitor companies (e.g., a Google
cloud server and an Amazon cloud server). A detailed system setup of our solution is
described later.
There are many cryptographic protocols for SMC, one of them being Yao’s garbled
circuit [139], which is what we use for the evaluation in this chapter. To summarize the
technique, it can be decomposed into the following steps:
(i). The function F (x, y) is described as a Boolean circuit with log x+log y input gates.
The circuit is known to both Alice and Bob.
(ii). Alice garbles (encrypts) the circuit. Hence Alice is called the garbler.
(iii). Alice sends the garbled circuit to Bob along with her encrypted input (encryption
of x).
2Beta estimate is the coefficient learnt in linear regression model.
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(iv). Bob receives his encrypted input (encryption of y) from Alice through oblivious
transfer [140].
(v). Bob evaluates (decrypts) the circuit (NOT the inputs) and obtains the encrypted
output. Hence Bob is called the evaluator.
(vi). Alice and Bob communicate to learn the output.
The above Step (iv) uses a protocol called oblivious transfer, whose functionality can
be defined as follows:
Definition 4.2 (Oblivious transfer). Suppose there are two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice
has two values v0 and v1, whereas Bob has one value i ∈ {0, 1}. Oblivious transfer (OT)
enables Bob to obtain value vi, without Alice learning i, nor Bob learning v1−i.
To make things more clear, we present below a simple (but inefficient) implementation
of Yao’s garbled circuit in Protocol 0. Researchers have proposed various optimization
techniques to improve its efficiency, such as Free XOR gates [141], Half AND gates [142],
OT extension [143, 144, 145] and Point-and-permute [146, 141, 147]. Discussing all these
techniques is out of scope of this thesis, although most of them are implemented in the
library used by our evaluation.
4.1.3 Differential Privacy
Informally, differential privacy guarantees that a persons contribution to a dataset does
not significantly alter the output distribution of a statistical query on the dataset. Let
U denote the universe of entities, 2U denote the powerset of U , and D (∈ 2U ) denote a
dataset.
Definition 4.3 (Differential privacy). A randomized mechanism K provides (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy if and only if, for any two data sets D and D′ which differ in at
most one individual, and for any S ⊆ range(K),
Pr[K(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫPr[K(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
We then introduce the sensitivity of a function f : 2U → Rd: it characterizes the
largest possible change in the value of f , when one data element is replaced.
Definition 4.4 (lk-sensitivity). The lk-sensitivity of a function f : 2
U → Rd is ∆kf =
maxD1,D2 ||f(D1)−f(D2)||k, where D1 and D2 are datasets differing in a single element.
k is usually 1 or 2.
In the standard approach of adding Laplacian noise, we are concerned about l1-
sensitivity; releasing f(D) +w, where w is random noise drawn from a Laplace distribu-
tion with mean 0 and scale ∆1fǫ , satisfies (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy, or just ǫ-differential
privacy. For example, to release minor allele frequency of a SNV while satisfying ǫ-
differential privacy, it is proved that we should add Laplacian noise with scale ∆1fǫ =
1/N
ǫ ,
where N is the size of the dataset [13]. By adding Gaussian noise with standard deviation
that depends on ǫ and δ, we can achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [148], which is discussed
in more detail in Section 4.3.1. Smaller ǫ and δ imply higher noise variance and stronger
privacy. Although differential privacy reduces the accuracy of GWAS applications, we
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Procotol 0 Garbled circuit protocol
- Input: Alice has input x, Bob has input y.
- Circuit description: Alice and Bob describe the function F (x, y) as a circuit out of
2-input XOR and AND gates.
- Garbling: For any gate G (XOR or AND), let us denote its two input wires as wa,
wb, and output wire as wc. For each wire, Alice generates two 128-bit random values for
the two possible values (0 or 1) of the wire. In other words, we have the following:
• Wire wa: Generates Xa0 and Xa1 ;
• Wire wb: Generates Xb0 and Xb1;
• Wire wc: Generates Xc0 and Xc1 .
Afterwards, Alice garbles the truth table of G with a double-key symmetric encryption
Ek1,k2 . Namely, Alice generates four ciphertexts: EXai ,Xbj (X
c
G(i,j)), for i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
Moreover, Alice randomly permutes the four ciphertexts.
- Data transfer: There are three parts that require communication:
• For each gate, Alice sends the corresponding four ciphertexts to Bob.
• For Alice’s input x with m bits x0, x1, · · · , xm−1 that correspond to the m in-
put wires wa0 , wa1 , · · · , wam−1 , Alice sends the corresponding m random values
Xaixi , ∀i ∈ 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1.
• For Bob’s input y with n bits y0, y1, · · · , yn−1 that correspond to the n input wires
wb0 , wb1 , · · · , wbn−1 , Alice and Bob engage in n instances of 1-out-of-2 oblivious
transfer protocols: in the i-th instance, Alice has two random values Xbi0 and X
bi
1 ,
Bob has the selection bit yi, and finally Bob obtains its random value X
bi
yi .
- Evaluation: Bob evaluates the circuit from input to output. For each gate he en-
counters, he has four ciphertexts EXai ,Xbj (X
c
G(i,j)) (for i, j ∈ {0, 1}), and two random
input values Xa and Xb, where Xa is Xa0 or X
a
1 , and X
b is Xb0 or X
b
1. Hence, Bob
can decrypt exactly one of the four ciphertexts and reveal one output random value Xc.
In the circuit, Xc might be used later (as an input random value Xa
′
or Xb
′
) for the
decryption of any following gate.
- Revealing output: After evaluating the whole circuit of function F (x, y), Bob has a
list of k output random values, Xci , ∀i ∈ 0, 1, · · · , k − 1, and Alice knows its mapping to
Boolean values because she generated both random values Xci0 and X
ci
1 for every output
wire wci . Therefore, Alice and Bob can communicate to reveal the output r = F (x, y),
whose binary representation is: ri = 0 if X
ci = Xci0 , and ri = 1 if X
ci = Xci1 .
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will justify its use in the case of quality control; in short, the way we apply differential
privacy in quality control does not affect the utility of the data in the meta-analysis
phase.
4.2 Adversary Model and System Structure
We adopt the standard security notion of semi-honest model for secure computation,
which implies that corrupted parties do not deviate from the protocol specification but
might try to gather information out of the protocol. From a data owner’s point of view,
potential adversaries include external attackers and curious or corrupted parties in the
protocol (e.g., cloud servers or analysts in Figure 4.1). We assume the adversary knows
the set of genomic variants SNVs {SNV1, SNV2, · · · , SNVn} shared by all studies.
The storage and computation are outsourced to two non-colluding, semi-honest cloud
providers (A and B). Each cloud server could be equipped with a cluster of machines to
enable parallel secure computation. The system works as follows (Figure 4.1):
Step 1. Each study splits its aggregate statistics X (e.g. fi,j) into two secret shares:
X = X1 ⊕ X2 (bit-by-bit XOR operation on the whole value), where X1 is randomly
chosen. X1 is encrypted and sent to cloud A, whereas X2 is encrypted and sent to cloud
B. ‘[X]’ represents the encryption of ‘X’ in Figure 4.1. Essentially, in our system, all
the communication links are protected with authenticated symmetric encryption that is
a well-established security feature in the Internet (e.g. when we use HTTPS instead of
HTTP). The protection of X1 in cloud A and X2 in cloud B will be detailed in Section
4.5.
Step 2. An analyst sends a request to cloud A for checking data quality.
Step 3. The two clouds execute a secure two-party computation protocol to perform
the quality control procedure on the secret shared input data of each study. The quality
measurements are sent back to the analyst.
Step 4. If there is no quality issue, the analyst sends another request to cloud A for
running a meta-analysis approach, and Step 5 follows. Otherwise, the analyst contacts
the study whose data present quality issues, and the study administrator resolves these
issues and goes back to Step 1.
Step 5. The two clouds execute another different secure two-party computation
protocol to perform meta-analysis on the data. The result is sent back to the analyst.
This step has been studied in previous work [29] and is not described here.
4.3 Secure Quality Control
In this section, we introduce our design for a secure quality control (SQC) procedure,
and apply the design to several important quality-control scenarios. We divide this
section into two sub sections: the first sub section describes several secure-computation
procedures that serve as the building blocks for protocols in the second sub section.
4.3.1 Secure Computation Procedures
SQC is composed of several important procedures, each of which has an added value
to the protection of the data. Unless otherwise specified, all the following procedures
are performed in secure two-party computation by each of the two clouds on two secret
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Plaintext Procedure
Require: X
Ensure: f(X)
r ← f(X)
return r
SMC Procedure
Require: Alice’s input is X1, Bob’s input is X2, and X1 ⊕X2 = X
Ensure: Alice and Bob output f(X)
Define F (X1, X2) as follows:
X ← X1 ⊕X2;
f(X).
Alice and Bob execute Protocol 0 for evaluating function F with
Alice’s input x = X1 and Bob’s input y = X2. Alice and Bob reveal
output r = F (x, y) at the end of the protocol.
return r
Figure 4.2: SMC conversion. The figure shows a general guideline for converting a
plaintext procedure to an SMC procedure. It applies to all procedures and protocols
described in this section.
Procedure 1 Oblivious sorting
Require: : A list L
Ensure: : A sorted list L′
L′ ← bitonicSort(L)
return L′.
share of the input (LA and LB respectively), rather than a traditional one that is executed
on a single party that has the whole input. We stick to such an abbreviated presentation
in all following procedures and protocols.
Procedure 2: Adding Gaussian noise
In most cases of genomic computation (e.g., GWAS, risk test), accuracy is of paramount
importance. Therefore, many privacy-preserving techniques that introduce noise to
data are criticized because of their unacceptable negative impact on computation accu-
racy [152, 24], even though a lot of advances have been made to apply these techniques
in order to enable genomic data sharing [13, 14, 153, 16, 154]. However, quality control
is meant to detect systematic errors of a study, hence analysts are concerned mainly
about the global characteristics of the data, rather than the precise value of individual
data points. For example, analysts might expect to see the data points cluster along the
diagonal line of a pane rather than a horizontal line. Such a relatively loose requirement
provides us room to change the data points of the results in a manner such that the
output patterns can still lead to the same conclusion on the data quality (some results
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are presented in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8).
In two-party computation, two methods have been explored for adding Laplacian
noises to the output. In the first approach [155, 156], Laplacian noises are generated
from an approximate Laplacian distribution. In theory, a Laplacian distribution can be
exactly constructed from a uniform distribution because of the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 ([157]). If X ∼ U(− 12 , 12 ) (uniform distribution), then
Y = µ− b · sgn(X) · ln(1− 2|X|) ∼ Laplace(µ, b),
where µ and b are the mean and scale parameters of the Laplace distribution, and sgn(X)
denotes the sign of X.
This is a direct result of the inverse transform sampling. It is easy for two parties
to jointly draw a sample from a uniform distribution without either party knowing the
sample, as the summation of two uniformly distributed variable from same sample space
remains a uniformly distributed variable in the sample space. However, this approach
requires computing a logarithm operation afterwards, which can only be approximated
through Taylor series with state-of-the-art SMC techniques and hence is computationally
intensive. For example, it took about 5 seconds for two parties to generate a Laplacian
scalar variable securely in a collaborative fashion on 2.4 GHz processors [156]. This
remains impractical given the fact that we need to process millions of SNVs for each
study.
In the second approach [158], a Laplacian sample is generated by using the following
proposition:
Proposition 4.2 ([159]). Let Xi ∼ N (0, λ) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} be four independent
Gaussian random variables. Then,
Y = (X21 −X22 ) + (X23 −X24 ) ∼ Laplace(0, 2λ2).
This proposition provides a way for two parties to cooperatively generate a Laplacian
random variable that is unknown by each party. In this method, one party produces its
noisy share X21 − X22 , whereas the other one produces its noisy share X23 − X24 . The
two parties then engage in a secure addition operation, which is quite efficient. However,
the problem with this approach is that the noisy shares, X21 − X22 and X23 − X24 , do
not follow the Laplacian distribution. Therefore, the method provides some privacy
protection against each party, but it is not proven to satisfy any bound of differential
privacy.
In this framework, we achieve differential privacy through adding Gaussian noise. We
make use of the following two results.
Theorem 4.1 (Gaussian Mechanism [148]). Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. For c2 >
2 ln( 1.25δ ), the Gaussian Mechanism that adds zero-mean Gaussian noise with standard
deviation σ ≥ c∆2(f)ǫ >
√
2 ln( 1.25
δ
)∆2(f)
ǫ is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proposition 4.3 ([160]). Let X1, X2 ∼ N (0, σ2) be two independent Gaussian random
variables. Then,
Y = X1 +X2 ∼ N (0, 2σ2).
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Therefore, each party independently draws a random sample from the Gaussian dis-
tribution, computes the addition of the two samples via SMC, and adds the result to the
statistics (Procedure 2). Because of Proposition 4.3, we can provide theoretical guarantee
that the noisy result is differentially private against the two parties that engage in SMC
and any external party that knows neither X1 nor X2. We have the following result.
Corollary 4.1. Procedure 2 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private against the honest-but-curious
adversary which controls at most one of the cloud servers.
Proof. Because an honest-but-curious adversary controlling Cloud A (resp., Cloud B)
can remove its own noise X1 (resp., X2) from the output f +w, resulting in f +w−X1
(resp., f + w −X2), from Theorem 4.1, the output is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.

Note that this procedure is executed on the fly for checking data quality without
affecting the stored data, hence the data can still be used at a later stage (e.g., for
meta-analysis) without any accuracy loss.
Procedure 2 Adding Gaussian noise
Require: : Original value f
Privacy parameters ǫ and δ
Sensitivity ∆2(f)
Ensure: : f + w, where w is a Gaussian noise
σ ←
√
2 ln( 1.25
δ
)∆2(f)
ǫ (Theorem 4.1)
X1 ← N (0, σ2) (Cloud A draws a random sample X1 from the Gaussian distribution)
X2 ← N (0, σ2) (Cloud B draws a random sample X2 from the Gaussian distribution)
w ← X1 +X2
r ← f + w
return r
Procedure 3: Precision truncation
Truncating the precision of statistics serves two purposes in this framework: First, apart
from differential privacy, it is an alternative way to add noise to the data; second, it helps
to reduce the number of SNVs that can be revealed, undermining the power of inference
attacks. The second feature will be discussed in the next procedure. In Procedure 3,
we use fix-point representations (more efficient than floating-point operations), reserve a
predefined precision and round the statistics to the nearest reduced-precision represen-
tation. For a fix-point statistics x that has w-bit width (total number of bits) and t-bit
offset (number of bits for the fractional part), we preserve r bits after leading zeros (so
that small fractional numbers, such as p-value 10−8, are not truncated to zero).
Procedure 4: Oblivious de-duplication
After reducing precision, we might observe a high number of repetitive statistics. For
example, if we have 4 million SNVs and preserve 10-bit precision (around 3 decimal
digits), we could expect on average 4000 duplicates per SNV statistics. Not only is
this frequency information useless for analysts to construct quality-control plots, but
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Procedure 3 Precision reduction
Require: : Precision r bits, and a fix-point number x with w-bit width and t-bit offset.
Ensure: : A fix-point number x′ that sets all other bits of x to zero except the first r
bits after the leading zeros of x.
x′ ← x
[Step 1] Starting from the most significant bit, skip leading zeros of x′
[Step 2] Preserve at most r bits after leading zeros
if there are m (>= 1) bits after Step 2 then
carry ← the most significant bit of the m bits
Set the remaining m bits of x′ to 0
{We should avoid overflow when rounding up.}
if the highest (w −m) bits of x′ are not all 1s then
x′ ← x′ + carry × 2m
return x′.
also a potential privacy leakage to adversaries. In Procedure 4, we perform an oblivious
sorting to cluster duplicated items together, preserve one of them by setting the others to
the infinity element, and perform another round of oblivious sorting in order to discard
the infinity elements. The second round of sorting is necessary to avoid leaking which
elements are duplicated (and how many times they are duplicated).
Procedure 4 Oblivious de-duplication
Require: : a sorted sequence L of length n.
Ensure: : a de-duplicated sequence L′ of length n′, n′ ≪ n.
Apply Procedure 1 to L. We denote the sorted sequence as L′.
previous item← L′1
for i = 2→ n do
if L′i == previous item then
L′i ← ⊥ (⊥ is defined as the infinity element)
else
previous item← L′i
Apply Procedure 1 to L′, and discard all the elements of ⊥ at the end, resulting in a
new sequence L′′ of length n′.
return L′′.
4.3.2 Secure Quality Control Protocols
Using the above design, we propose our methodology to run several quality-control pro-
tocols [132] in a secure and privacy-preserving way. In absence of the secure protocols
described below, a large number of original SNV-level statistics would be revealed, mak-
ing them vulnerable to inference attacks, hence each SQC protocol is necessary to avoid
leaking those (precise) SNV-level statistics.
Protocol 1: Secure SE-N plot
An analyst can plot the median standard error (SE) across all SNVs against the square
root of the sample size (N) for each study, in order to identify analytical problems,
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e.g., inconsistent regression models. More specifically, for study j with sample size Nj
(public value), the analyst finds the median in the corresponding list of standard errors:
e1,j , e2,j , · · · , en,j . We denote this median with emedian,j . If the study data have no
quality issues,
√
Nj is proportional to the inverse of emedian,j by a public constant
c [132]: √
Nj ≈ c · 1
emedian,j
.
Therefore, the study-specific data points of the SE-N plot should resemble a straight
line. Protocol 1 applies oblivious sorting to each list of standard errors and chooses
the corresponding median afterwards. A more efficient median-finding algorithm can be
derived by using the selection networks [161, 151]. We note that there is no need to go
through Procedure 3 and Procedure 4 in this protocol because the output for each study
contains only one overall statistics (median) across all SNVs, which is different from the
following two protocols.
Procotol 1 Secure SE-N processing
Require: :
List of standard errors from m studies: L1, L2, · · · , Lm.
Lj = {e1,j , e2,j , · · · , en,j}.
Ensure: :
List of median standard errors:
{emedian,1, emedian,2, · · · , emedian,m}
for j = 1→ m do
Apply Procedure 1 to list Lj
emedian,j ← the median of list Lj
return {emedian,1, emedian,2, · · · , emedian,m}.
Protocol 2: Secure EAF plot
The EAF (effect allele frequency) protocol plots the reported EAFs from a study against
another study, which could pinpoint issues such as a wrong strand, allele miscoding,
etc. For example, a study might consistently label the wrong allele as the effect allele,
leading to wrong allele frequencies. If the two studies j1 and j2 have no quality issues
and their samples come from the same ancestry, then fi,j1 should be close to fi,j2 , ∀i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}. The two sets of allele frequencies are taken as input to Protocol 2, which
first reduces the precision of allele frequencies (Procedure 3) and then de-duplicates the
pairs of EAFs (Procedure 4) from the two studies.
Protocol 3: Secure P-Z plot
The P-Z plot (P -value and Z-statistics) can reveal analytical problems of the computa-
tion of beta estimates (linear regression coefficients), standard errors or P -values. More
specifically, for SNVi of study j, the Z-statistics is computed as follows:
Z-statistics =
βi,j
ei,j
.
The corresponding reported P -value pi,j should be close to the P -value associated with
the above Z-statistics. In the first step of Protocol 3, the two servers perform a secure
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Procotol 2 Secure EAF processing
Require: :
List of effect allele frequencies from study j1: {f1,j1 , f2,j1 , · · · , fn,j1};
List of effect allele frequencies from study j2: {f1,j2 , f2,j2 , · · · , fn,j2};
Precision: r bits.
Ensure: :
List of reduced-precision and de-duplicated EAF tuples:
{(f ′′i,j1 , f ′′i,j2)}, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n′}, n′ ≪ n.
for i = 1→ n do
f ′i,j1 ← Procedure 2 and 3 on number fi,j1
f ′i,j2 ← Procedure 2 and 3 on number fi,j2
return the result of applying Procedure 4 on the list of tuples:
{(f ′i,j1 , f ′i,j2)}, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
division protocol to compute the Z-statistics, which is known to be a costly operation in
secure computation. We benchmark this step in Section 4.4.2. The resultant Z-statistics
are paired with the corresponding P -values to go through a similar precision-reduction
and de-duplication procedure as in Protocol 2.
Procotol 3 Secure P-Z processing
Require: :
Lists (length n) of p-values, beta estimates, and standard errors from study j;
Precision: r bits.
Ensure: :
List of reduced-precision and de-duplicated P-Z tuples:
{(p′′i,j , Z ′′i,j)}, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n′}, n′ ≪ n.
for i = 1→ n do
Zi,j ← βi,jei,j (secure division in garbled circuits)
for i = 1→ n do
p′i,j ← Procedure 3 on precision r and number pi,j
Z ′i,j ← Procedure 3 on precision r and number Zi,j
return the result of applying Procedure 4 on the list of tuples:
{(p′i,j , Z ′i,j)}, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
4.4 Implementation and Evaluation
We use ObliVM-GC [162] for our backend secure two-party computation. This framework
provides a Java library that helps programmers to build secure-computation protocols in
a circuit representation. Nayak et al. wrap it into a parallel secure-computing paradigm
that we use to scale up our solution [163]. Our experiment uses two sets of data:
• Real data: GWAS data from 10 studies, each of which builds a linear regression
model between human height and each of roughly three million SNVs [164].
• Simulated data: Following another work [165], we choose a study size (N) and a
number of SNVs (n). For each SNV, we pick a random number in the range of
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0.05 to 0.5 as the minor allele frequency. We then generated the genotypes of N
individuals independently. For example, we choose N = 1000 and n = 3000000,
which is similar to the size of our real data.
4.4.1 Privacy and Utility Analysis
Log likelihood ratio test. As we apply differential privacy to the allele frequencies that
are the major vulnerability exploited by inference attacks, we experimentally analyze the
privacy of our solution by using the attack power as a metric. The log likelihood ratio
test is one of the most powerful inference attacks for individual detection in a pool [136].
To construct the test, we assume a reference population with specified allele frequencies
for variants, and we sample a pool of 1000 individuals from this reference population.
The null hypothesis of the test is that a tested individual is not in the pool. An LLR
statistic for the tested individual is computed based on the genotype frequencies of the
reference population and the pool, in order to tell whether the individual is included in
the pool.
The larger the LLR statistic is, the higher is the probability that individual i is in
the case group (i.e. lower P -value for the test). To assess the attack power, we construct
two groups: one case group (same as the pool) and one test group, for nine different
experiments. We then calculate the LLR statistics for each individual in the two groups,
rescale them to the range [0, 1], and analyze their distribution (Figure 4.3). A wider gap
between the case distribution and the test distribution indicates a higher attack power.
From the results, it is evident that privacy can be enhanced by requiring a higher level
of differential privacy and releasing fewer SNVs.
Note that the absolute values of the LLR statistics are invisible in Figure 4.3, due
to the rescaling operation; in fact, for the eight experiments of adding noise, the LLR
statistics are extremely small (hence P -values close to 1). This is because the effect of
adding noise, even with the least amount of differential privacy (ǫ = 0.1, δ = 0.05), dom-
inates over the effect of sampling, which indicates that the tested individual is actually
closer to the reference population than to the ‘noisy’ pool. However, we can still observe
the interesting relative difference between the case group and the test group. To quan-
tify the attack power, we measure the gap between the case distribution and the test
distribution of Figure 4.3 by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance (instead of performing
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to tell whether the two samples are drawn from the same
distribution, we are more interested in measuring the distance between the two). The
result is illustrated in Figure 4.4. A larger distance indicates less privacy, because it
would be easier for an attacker to differentiate the two groups. We observe that adding
the least amount of differential privacy in SQC can already greatly reduce the attack
power and strengthen the privacy.
Most of the time, an attacker does not have access to genotypes of a large group of
individuals. But assuming the attacker has the genotype of a victim, he must make an
assessment about whether the victim is in the pool based on one LLR statistic. Note
that using the P -value for the assessment is not effective in our scenario for the same
reason discussed above. From an attacker’s point of view, Chen et al. define a classifier
with a threshold τ : if LLR(i) ≥ τ , then individual i is classified to be in the case
group, otherwise it is in the test group [166]. To have a high true positive rate, we set
a low τ value, e.g. at the lowest 1 percentile of the case group (99% true positive rate).
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Figure 4.4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov distances between case LLR statistics and test LLR
statistics. The distances correspond to the visualized gaps in Figure 4.3. The larger the
distance is, the stronger the attacker power is, hence the less the privacy is. Adding the
least amount of differential privacy (ǫ = 0.1, δ = 0.05) in SQC can already greatly reduce
the attack power and strengthen the privacy.
We observe the false positive rates in the test group for the above nine experiments
(Figure 4.5). If the data is released without adding noise, an attacker can easily achieve
low false positive rates (i.e. effective attack) even if only a small number of SNVs are
released. For example, the false positive rate is less than 40% when only 10000 SNVs are
released. Differential privacy adding the lowest amount of noise in our experiment (i.e.,
ǫ = 0.1, δ = 0.05) can effectively thwart the attack. With stronger differential privacy,
more SNVs can be released at the same false positive rate for an attacker. Nevertheless,
we will see that with SQC, only a small number of SNVs need to be released in order
to achieve good utility, hence we can add a low level of Gaussian noise for differential
privacy, e.g., ǫ = 0.1, δ = 0.05.
Effects of precision r. From the above results, we observe that the number of
SNVs used in the attack significantly influences the attack power. For example, when
releasing one million SNVs, there is almost no privacy at all for all the privacy parameters
in the experiments; but the strongest privacy parameters (ǫ = 0.05, δ = 0.001) that we
use already have a non-trivial negative impact on the utility of the data (Figure 4.6).
Therefore, it is crucial that our SQC protocols output a relatively small number of SNVs
after de-duplication, hence achieving a good trade-off between privacy and utility. This
number actually depends on the precision r in Procedure 3 used by Protocol 2 (analogous
to Protocol 3): The higher the precision is, the more EAF pairs the protocol outputs.
Roughly speaking, the maximum number of de-duplicated EAF pairs for precision r is
4r .
We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach by setting different combinations of
parameters (ǫ, δ, r), and observe the patterns of EAF plots in Figure 4.7. We also calculate
the false positive rates (at 0.99 true positive rate) of LLR test on the output EAF data
by assuming, pessimistically, that the adversary is able to link the EAF data back to
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their SNV identifiers and then perform LLR test. As the precision increases, the number
of de-duplicated EAF pairs grows exponentially and thus the false positive rate drops
accordingly, but the plot is better preserved. Nevertheless, we can still observe the plot
pattern even at a low precision r = 5, but it fades out when we further decrease the
precision because points become sparse. By observing the distinction between Figure
4.7-b and Figure 4.7-c, the differential privacy parameter ǫ has a significant influence
on the plot pattern, and ǫ = 0.1 is a reasonable choice; in contrast, parameter δ has a
relatively modest effect on the pattern. To guarantee a reasonable privacy level (i.e. high
false positive rate) and preserve useful plot patterns, it is a good choice to set ǫ = 0.1
and r = 5 or 7, and to fine tune the result by choosing δ.
Example: Visualization of EAF Plots
Due to Gaussian noises, precision reduction, and de-duplication, the numerical output
of SQC protocols is very different from that of insecure QC protocols. However, in this
section, we show that by guaranteeing a reasonable privacy level, SQC can still maintain
the useful global characteristics for quality control. We take the secure EAF protocol
as an example, because it encompasses all the above three procedures and results in the
most noisy output. In our experiment, we set ǫ = 0.1, δ = 0.05, and precision r = 7.
Combining these parameters, the secure EAF protocol outputs on average 4340 noisy
and low-precision SNV pairs. Even if we assume that an adversary is able to link these
SNVs back to their identifiers, it still has more than 90% false positive rate when trying
to perform Homer’s attack (Figure 4.5). We evaluate the utility of the output plots in
Figure 4.8. It is evident that SQC maintains the quality (good or bad) of the data, with
a slight dispersion of data points.
4.4.2 Runtime Analysis
Single machine. Secure computation provides strong security, but this comes at the cost
of a high computational overhead. Even with current techniques and implementation, the
slowdown of secure computation is as high as thousands or even hundreds of thousands
of times, compared with non-secure, plaintext computation [162]. The following results
are obtained on a single machine with Intel Core i7 processor clocked at 3.1 GHz and 16
GB of RAM.
Secure operation benchmark. Before executing the whole SQC protocols, we
benchmark the different core computation procedures on a small set of 1000 SNVs. Table
4.1 shows the result of benchmarking. In secure computation based on garbled circuits,
another measurement of performance is the number of AND gates generated during
computation; this number is linearly proportional to the running time and communication
cost. Oblivious sorting has a complexity of O(n log2 n) [150], whereas all other procedures
have a linear complexity as the number of SNVs increases. For example, with sequential
implementation, we estimate it will take around 7.5 hours to accomplish oblivious sorting
of 3 million SNV statistics of 64-bit representation. We also see that secure division
incurs a high overhead, especially when bit length of numerator (denominator) increases;
indeed, the complexity of a secure division is O(l2) for two numbers of l bits. In our
SQC framework, secure division is only used for beta estimates and standard errors that
are represented by 32-bit fix-point numbers, hence it will take 5.46 seconds on average to
execute secure division for 1000 SNVs. This is roughly the same cost as oblivious sorting
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Procedure Bits Time AND gates
Oblivious sorting
32 3.11s 1726976
64 5.94s 3453952
96 8.83s 5180928
Differential privacy
32 0.813s 192000
64 1.472s 384000
96 2.126s 576000
Precision reduction
32 3.57s 2015000
64 6.7s 4127000
96 9.84s 6239000
De-duplication
(without sorting
steps)
32 0.26s 94905
64 0.4s 190809
96 0.57s 286713
Secure division
32 5.46s 3230000
64 20.09s 12606000
96 46.19s 28126000
Table 4.1: Benchmark results of the computation steps, conditioning on 1000 SNVs.
Oblivious sorting has a complexity of O(n log2 n), whereas all other procedures have a
linear blowup of complexity as the number of SNVs increase.
million SNVs. In total, executing the three quality control tasks takes about one hour,
which we deem to be an acceptable cost, considering the days or even months of data
access authorization procedures for biomedical studies. SQC safeguards the studies and
minimizes the privacy concerns, producing a minimal interface where researchers retrieve
sanitized and useful results in practical running time through parallel computation.
4.5 Discussion
Even though the data are not revealed as long as cloud A and cloud B do not collude,
X1 and X2 should still be protected, considering that potential data breaches can occur
on both clouds. The protection can be enforced on three levels, including hard disks,
memory and cache. For example, on the level of the hard disk, HIPAA compliant cloud
services could be one solution that normally encrypts the storage on disk. In this way,
even if attackers steal the data on a disk from both clouds, they are not able to recover
the original information. On the level of memory, the use of trusted hardware (e.g.,
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX)) [22] has become an increasingly popular and
powerful approach in recent years. This approach encrypts the memory so that attack-
ers cannot steal the information, even by compromising the memory. There are more
sophisticated attacks that occur, however, on the CPU cache level [41, 40]. There are
different countermeasures proposed to thwart these attacks, but few of them are effective
enough to be widely deployed in practice. The aforementioned cloud-protection methods
are orthogonal to this work and could be added as components to our system.
For the effectiveness of hiding variants, we should emphasize that it is difficult to argue
about the privacy guarantee of Procedure 1 alone, either theoretically or experimentally.
Indeed, if the adversary has public reference statistics, it might be able to roughly map
the identities by sorting the public statistics and comparing them with the sorted study
statistics, but the precision of the mapping is highly data-dependent.
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4.6 Summary
Overall, SQC addresses the pressing issues of quality controlling privacy-preserving ag-
gregate data sharing. By using a set of sanitization processes and advanced crypto-
graphic tools, SQC guarantees that users of the framework have access to only minimal
but sufficient output information that is unlikely to be useful for inference attacks. In
particular, SQC automates the quality control phase in GWAS meta-analysis in a privacy-
preserving manner. By projecting the quality-control protocols in a secure computation
framework, SQC offers an effective balance between the needs of researchers for GWAS
meta-analysis and the needs of data owners to respect the genetic privacy of research
participants. Moreover, running SQC does not incur any utility loss for subsequent meta
analyses. Although the strong security and privacy guarantees of SQC comes with in-
tensive computation, we demonstrate that it is practical to perform the task using a
recently proposed parallel secure computation framework. Considering the months-long
discussions required for data access agreement, the SQC framework, once established, is
promising for automating both the data sharing and protection, hence paving the way
for large-scale medical research.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have investigated the potential threats of cloud-based genomic com-
puting systems and have proposed various countermeasures by taking into account the
functionality requirements. We have shown how to choose appropriate privacy-enhancing
techniques in order to design the privacy-conscious counterpart of existing cloud-based
genomic computing systems. Different techniques have different advantages and limi-
tations, which system designers must carefully consider in order to avoid pitfalls (e.g.,
security vulnerabilities, inefficiency, low accuracy).
In Chapter 2, we have presented a robust cloud storage system of genomic data
for end users who can employ password-based encryption to protect their data from
brute-force attacks. We have proposed GenoGuard to defend against data breaches
that involve a computationally unbounded adversary who can brute-force passwords or
even cryptographic keys. With various data breaches showing that users tend to choose
weak passwords, GenoGuard is particularly useful in the case of the password-based
encryption that is frequently used by direct-to-consumer services. GenoGuard is built on
honey encryption, where plaintext messages need to be transformed to a different space
with uniform distribution on elements. We designed a novel distribution-transformation
encoder for honey encryption. This encoder employs a hidden Markov chain on genome
sequence, and our chi-square test shows that the model fits well on the distribution of
genotypes. We have also presented a thorough security proof on the resulting honey
encryption scheme that uses our new distribution-transformation encoder. To ensure a
security loss smaller than 2−200, GenoGuard needs to expand the storage by only a factor
slightly larger than 2; in exchange for this, users gain the security property against brute-
force attacks on the encrypted data. We have also shown the high probability of being
able to break the conventional password-based encryption scheme if the password set is
limited (e.g., 1000 passwords), whereas GenoGuard remains robust in the same scenario.
In addition, we have proposed and analyzed techniques for preventing an adversary
from exploiting phenotype information (physical traits of victims) in order to decrypt
genomes. For example, with the “red” hair information, an adversary’s advantage can
increase from 0.0379 to 0.0642. The countermeasure to this problem is to incorporate the
side information during the encoding phase, which we have demonstrated for the case of
ancestry information. Our Python implementation requires around 1 minute to encrypt
22 chromosomes on a cluster of 22 nodes.
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In Chapter 3, we have introduced a privacy-preserving solution, SECRAM: it offers
efficient random retrieval on large encrypted genomic data. Researchers or doctors are
sometimes interested in retrieving the highly redundant raw genomic data, in addition to
genetic variants, in order to discover some other useful information or sequencing errors.
With 3 billion nucleotides being replicated and stored multiple times in a file (sometimes
even randomly located), the data of one person can go up to several hundred gigabytes,
posing two major technical challenges: storage costs and data processing efficiency. In
this regard, we have presented a privacy-preserving solution for the secure storage and
efficient retrieval of compressed aligned genomic data. We have shown the possibility
of storing read-based genomic data in a transposed manner, and of still maintaining all
information with lossless compression. Compared with BAM (the current standard),
SECRAM provides strong protection and saves 18% of storage on average, when the cov-
erage is higher than 10×. For example, BAM uses 472 MB to store human chromosome
11 with 3× coverage, whereas SECRAM only uses 407 MB. SECRAM also offers efficient
data retrieval that requires less than 0.25 seconds to obtain 1 million genomic positions
with a 3× coverage. We maintain both efficient compression and downstream data pro-
cessing in SECRAM, and we provide unprecedented levels of security in genomic data
storage. SECRAM thus offers a space-saving, privacy-preserving, and efficient solution
for the storage of clinical genomic data.
Furthermore, SECRAM is a result of the collaboration project with the Swiss com-
pany Sophia Genetics that specialises in genomic analysis and data-driven medicine.
The biggest challenge and also most important lesson we learnt from this collaboration
is: the bioinformatics community has well-established storage formats and query inter-
faces, hence any newly designed framework (with security and privacy features) has to
comply with those for smooth integration with real applications. Our design is based on
a thorough evaluation of real deployment scenarios and requirements, which renders SE-
CRAM a highly compliant product for existing cloud systems. We have also discussed the
potential vulnerability of using order-preserving encryption. Although SECRAM offers a
smooth transition from current practice to a more privacy-conscious system, we envision
more secure cryptographic primitives to be integrated, such as searchable encryption.
In Chapter 4, we have described SQC in detail for securing genomic-data quality
control during genome-wide association meta-analysis. To some extent, fear-induced
regulations thwart the development of genomic analysis, especially after the revelation
of a number of powerful statistical inference attacks on aggregated data. As an alterna-
tive to the time-consuming data-sharing logistics, SQC demonstrates another possibility
that the data-analysis collaboration can be enabled in a secure manner by employing
advanced cryptographic techniques, such as secure multi-party computation based on
garbled circuit. Certainly, these techniques come at a high computational cost, but it is
modest compared to existing practices of data sharing. We have shown that the expected
patterns of data quality plots will have only a negligible change even after ensuring strong
differential privacy, rendering SQC a robust scheme for privacy-preserving data sharing.
The system makes use of parallel processing. To demonstrate the efficiency and scal-
ability on commodity machines, we have implemented the solution in a meta-analysis
pipeline with real data. As a result, we achieved a performance of one-hour execution
for three quality control protocols for one million genetic variants, on a cluster of 128
cores. With rapid advances in the cryptographic community, we expect the performance
of these advanced schemes to be much better in the near future, opening the possi-
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bility that efficient secure data-sharing protocols could substitute certain fear-induced
regulations.
In conclusion, we have devised various privacy-enhancing tools that data scientists
can exploit when facing a privacy and security requirement, and we have shown several
concrete privacy-conscious systems that employ these tools. As the sensitive nature of
genomic data becomes increasingly more visible to attackers, genomic-data protection
becomes more relevant to cloud computing. Nevertheless, despite its cutting-edge inter-
disciplinary research, privacy-conscious genomic computing systems are mostly based on
many techniques available in the cryptography community. Communication between the
genomic community and the cryptography community is of paramount importance. In
absence of this, hardly any solution can claim itself secure, useful, or even meaningful.
The state of the art in data hacking continues to advance, demanding ongoing efforts to
protect against the latest vulnerabilities. After completing this thesis, we can breathe
a sigh of relief because of the extensive powerful privacy-enhancing tools available, if
only on our academic shelves. But at the same time, we must persevere in further re-
search into cloud computing for genomic data due to the subtlety of privacy-enhancing
designs, such as efficiency, security, privacy level, accuracy, storage cost, and compat-
ibility. Meanwhile, we should educate the general public about the risks so that they
know to demand for better security and privacy in genomic applications. Surely, the
genomic-privacy community will remain busy for years to come, dealing with all these
problems and those as yet unimagined.
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